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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The General Problem 
In a world free of risk and uncertainty, the decision 
making function of farmers would be greatly simplified. A 
farmer could make plans for obtaining feasible goals and then 
simply carry out the plans. Static economic theory provides 
guides for making decisions when knowledge is complete. These 
choice guides bring together data and concepts from several 
sources. Resource use alternatives and the outcomes of 
alternative resource employment are specified by physical 
scientists. Sociologists and psychologists provide knowledge 
on the diversity of forces affecting man's activities. Their 
contributions lead to economic models which are flexible 
enough to include alternative or multiple goals and various 
resource situations. 
Obviously, the farmer decision making environment is 
not as described above. Uncertainty is introduced by tech­
nical and technological change, price variation and unpre­
dictable human action. Physical scientists cannot predict 
exactly the amount and quality of a product to be obtained 
from given resources. In most production processes, the input 
of factors such as weather and other natural phenomena is not 
known until production has taken place. Often, resource 
inputs are only classified quantitatively and Important 
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qualitative properties are ignored. These conditions lead 
to technical uncertainty in agriculture. 
Technological change is a second source of uncertainty. 
Change in production techniques, development of new products 
or inputs, and introduction of other innovations cannot be 
accurately predicted. Such developments may affect the de­
sirability of alternative plans which farmers can make. 
Price uncertainty is a third major problem of farmers. 
The static economic models rely heavily on knowledge of prices 
for making choices. Thus, the usefulness of those models is 
sharply reduced by the existence of price uncertainty. The 
complex of interrelated factors which contribute to price 
variability include: (a) world and national economic condi­
tions, (b) the general state of uncontrollable, natural 
phenomena affecting production, and (c) the commodity cycle 
phenomena. 
A fourth source of uncertainty to farmers results from 
their relationships with other individuals, groups of indi­
viduals and institutions. It is difficult to anticipate 
actions of other individuals or groups which may affect the 
farmer's plans. Farmers cannot predict governmental activ­
ities which affect future events and, thus, their own welfare. 
Man's goals change; therefore, plans made In one time period 
may not attain goals which exist in another time period. 
These factors increase farmer uncertainty. 
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This study considers uncertainty the usual environment 
for agricultural production. The term, uncertainty, has been 
used initially to describe a general condition of change, 
imperfect knowledge and lack of foresight. A more technical 
use of the term is introduced in later chapters. 
B. The Specific Problem 
Farmers must make decisions in their given, uncertain 
environment. How are those decisions to be made? Lack of 
knowledge of production conditions does not lessen farmers' 
desires to maximize the attainment of certain ends through use 
of available resources. They must observe, conceive ideas, 
make a decision, implement their plan and accept the" conse­
quences . How nearly they attain the desired results depends 
on managerial skill and "luck". This study suggests ways of 
increasing managerial skill. However, "luck" is courted 
through attention to mathematical probabilities and provision 
to benefit from various eventualities. 
C. Objectives of the Study 
Farmers can follow any of several models which specify 
how to operate under uncertainty. Most such schemes are dis­
cussed in Chapters II and III. These alternative decision 
models imply particular psychologies, resource situations and 
states of knowledge for individuals who use them. Research 
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and extension personnel often use the various models in making 
recommendations to farmers. 
The overall objective of this study is to provide a 
relevant framework for assisting farmers to select plans which 
are appropriate for their personal situation. One way to 
achieve this objective is to provide them with recommendations 
which are appropriate for their problem setting. Thus, the 
models used to derive recommendations must be suited to sev­
eral problem settings. Alternatively, different models may 
be used for different problem settings. Decision models must 
be analyzed to determine their implication with respect to 
goals, knowledge and resource position. Then, research and 
extension specialists may select choice models which are 
suited to the farmers whom they counsel. 
Little attention has previously been given to determining 
the appropriateness of the relatively new game theoretic tech­
niques for decision making under uncertainty. Other models, 
such as those discussed in Chapter II, are more highly 
developed and better known. Thus, the game theoretic deci­
sion criteria are emphasized in this study. This emphasis 
is motivated by need for research to determine the usefulness 
of the game theoretic criteria. A preliminary hypothesis is 
that the criteria have considerable application to farmer 
decision making under uncertainty. 
The specific major objectives of this study are: 
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( 1) To explain the game theoretic decision criteria, 
to demonstrate the mechanics of their use and to 
show their relationship to other decision models. 
(2) To evaluate the gsme theoretic criteria for use as 
decision models under uncertainty by (a) demonstrat­
ing the kinds of problem solution which they suggest; 
and (b) determining the type of problem settings 
for which they are appropriate. 
(3) To demonstrate the wide range of problem settings 
which farmers logically may have and to show the 
need for recommendations which are suited to those 
settings. 
(4) To demonstrate techniques for formulating farmer 
problems clearly and comprehensively. 
Other objectives are: 
(1) To review traditional approaches to decision making 
under uncertainty. 
(2) To demonstrate methods of processing and using 
available experimental data in various decision 
models. 
(3) To provide possible solutions to actual decision 
problems of Iowa farmers. 
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D. Presentation Outline 
Ideas in this dissertation are arranged in the order of 
their use in the problem solving process- The dissertation 
problem is stated in this introductory chapter. Chapter II 
is largely a summary of important contributions to the theory 
of choice In an uncertain environment. It provides a review 
of ideas which have been advanced for classifying states of 
knowledge. Theories about the way people may or do react to 
uncertainty are also included. Thus, Chapter II provides an 
important background for analytical work and discussion pre­
sented in following chapters. 
An introduction to the theory of games is presented in 
Chapter III. That section provides many of the concepts 
necessary for understanding and using the related game 
theoretic criteria discussed in the remainder of the chapter. 
The mathematical rules and techniques for using game criteria 
are presented and the criteria are further analyzed to deter­
mine their implications and to formulate ideas about their 
usefulness as tools for agricultural decision making. 
A general farmer decision problem is formulated in 
Chapter IV. The problem statement introduced there helps to 
delineate important components of farmer problems. Each com­
ponent is then examined to determine its effect on the final 
decision. Particular emphasis is given to the influence of 
the problem setting on decisions. The role of professional 
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agricultural workers in providing data and other assistance 
to farmers is discussed in Chapter IV. Suggestions sre made 
for modifying some current research and extension activities 
to increase their contributions to decision making under un­
certainty. 
The presentation up to Chapter V contains the necessary 
concepts and techniques for attacking actual farmer uncer­
tainty problems. These are drawn together in Chapter V to 
form a method for deriving solutions to farmer problems con­
sidered in later empirical chapters. The class of farmer-
problems considered in empirical chapters are specified in 
Chapter V. 
Chapters VI and VII are devoted to various crop and live­
stock problems. The solutions obtained for those problems 
allow evaluation of the alternative decision criteria* Pos­
sible outcomes for the solutions suggested by each criteria 
are also computed. The criterion appropriate for a given 
problem setting is determined by examining possible outcomes. 
The empirical chapters demonstrate techniques of using the 
criteria on a variety of farmer problems. 
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II. UNCERTAINTY THEORY 
The body of theory discussed in this chapter has grown 
out of various attempts to improve man's ability to deal with 
his uncertain environment. Contributors to the theory have 
included mathematicians, psychologists, economists, statis­
ticians and representatives from other disciplines. The 
theory provides models for classifying knowledge situations 
and predicting choice under various states of knowledge. 
It also provides alternative normative models for making 
decisions under different knowledge situations. Thus, a 
review of ideas relating to uncertainty provides an important 
background for the analysis undertaken in this dissertation. 
Uncertainty theory is reviewed in two parts. First, 
schemes for classifying knowledge situations are presented. 
Second, theories concerning the way individuals may or do 
choose in an uncertain environment are examined. This divi­
sion is useful for presentation; however, the two topics are 
not entirely separable. The nature of the uncertainty is 
determined subjectively by an individual and its classifica­
tion is influenced by his psychology (2, p. 405). His psy­
chology also influences decisions. 
A. Classification of Knowledge Situations 
Arrow (2, p. 410) designates two categories of descrip­
tions of uncertain consequences. One utilizes the language 
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of probability distributions. The other calls for other 
principles which may supplement or replace probability con­
cepts . Probability descriptions may be regarded as originat­
ing from several sources (2, p. 410). They may: (a) be sub­
jectively given to individuals, (b) come from limited numbers 
of a priori probabilities or (c) be derived by bringing degree 
of belief and frequency theories together by use of the law 
of large numbers (1, p. 71). As is seen later, probabilities 
are used in computing expected values of outcomes. Outcomes 
are usually referred to conceptually as utility units (6, 
p. 391). The use of various ideas on probability is evident 
from the discussion which follows. 
One well known classification of knowledge in an uncer­
tain situation is by Knight (28). Knight's classification is 
based on whether or not a priori or statistical probabilities 
can be specified for events of interest. If they can be, the 
situation is one of risk, and if they cannot, uncertainty 
prevails. His knowledge situations Include: (a) perfect 
certainty, (b) risk, and (c) uncertainty. Certainty is the 
state of knowledge In which static economic theory applies. 
Knight's classification is convenient for setting up 
decision models. Some decision models may be specified for 
use in risk situations and others for use under uncertainty. 
However, Knight's formulation has been criticized on other 
grounds. For example, it has been pointed out that a manager 
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may have a risk situation but may prefer to act as though 
uncertainty prevails in order to allow time to pass in wait­
ing for additional information (25). Knight's criterion for 
defining risk and uncertainty tends to neglect the possibility 
that knowledge situations are evaluated differently by indi­
viduals. One Individual may regard an event as certain, an­
other may attach a probability and a third may regard the 
event as completely uncertain. 
Tintner (40, 41, 42) has also made contributions to 
uncertainty theory. His "certainty" classification is the 
same as Knight's. The remainder of Tintner's classification 
falls in the realm of dynamic economic theory. The three 
knowledge situations under this category are: (a) single 
valued anticipations, (b) subjective risk, and (c) subjective 
uncertainty. Single valued anticipations may be used in the 
same manner as perfect knowledge, or they may be discounted. 
With subjective risk, there is a known probability distribu­
tion for the event of interest. In the use of subjective 
uncertainty, the decision maker has a subjective probability 
distribution of probability distributions. Tintner's classi­
fication has the advantage of including subjective as well 
as objective descriptive elements. 
Johnson and Haver (26) and Johnson (25) have defined 
five knowledge situations. These incorporate statistical 
evidence and experience with subjective individual consider­
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ations. Johnson's first class, subjective certainty, corre­
sponds to Knight's certainty but allows for an individual's 
conviction that knowledge may be regarded as perfect. His 
second class, subjective uncertainty, is divided into the 
following four cases: (a) "Risk action" is similar to Tint­
ner' s subjective risk. The farmer has sufficient information 
to take action if action is deemed appropriate. The plan 
may Include precautions for risk, (b) The "learning" ease 
occurs when a farmer thinks he has insufficient knowledge for 
action and decides to await additional knowledge, (c) An 
"inactive11 situation exists when a farmer has Inadequate 
information for action but declines to continue learning, 
(d) "Forced action" is a case where knowledge is insufficient 
but a decision must be made and action taken. Most of the 
problems considered in this dissertation are characterized 
by the fourth case. 
Shackle (36, 37) proposes another formulation of states 
of knowledge. He rejects all probability elements, particu­
larly those applied to important, unique decisions. Shackle 
says that "actuarial general principles and particular facts 
will only help if . . ." (36, pp. 607): (a) one is sure that 
the system observed now and in the past will remain the same 
so that inferences can be made for the future, (b) an Indi­
vidual is interested in the average result of many decisions 
on the same problem, and (c) there is assurance of having an 
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opportunity to make the same decision many times. 
For each outcome of a decision made in an uncertain situ­
ation, Shackle assumes there is a degree of potential surprise 
that this outcome will occur instead of some other. Each 
outcome-potential surprise pair is ranked in accordance with 
its ability to stimulate the mind. The highest and lowest 
ranking pairs of outcome-potential surprise are the ones 
determining what an individual will do. They are the only 
ones powerful enough to command the decision maker's atten­
tion. 
The preceding review of knowledge classification schemes 
helps to define the class of farmer decision problems con­
sidered in this dissertation. They are characterized by sub­
jective risk and subjective uncertainty. Most of the problems 
require action based on the knowledge available. In some 
cases, farmers may make decisions as though their anticipa­
tions are single valued. However, this situation may not 
result from confidence in available information but from 
lack of knowledge of other decision techniques. 
B. Models for Choice Under Uncertainty 
Literature describing the way individuals may or do make 
decisions in an uncertain environment includes: (1) attempts 
to explain the psychology of individuals with regard to un­
certainty, (2) evaluation of models or proposals for models 
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for decision making under uncertainty, and (3) enumeration 
of managerial steps which may be taken to avoid unfavorable 
contingencies. The first two are discussed in following para­
graphs. The third is discussed later in this chapter under 
the heading of "Measures for living with uncertainty11. 
Maximization of expected utilities is the model most 
commonly suggested for decision making under uncertainty. 
Criticisms of this model are directed at the difficulty of 
objectively measuring utility and the necessity of indefinite 
repetition of decisions under similar circumstances. Tint­
ner1 s suggestions for consideration of other parameters of 
distributions in addition to expected values reduces the 
Importance of these objections. Empirical applications of 
the model are often only concerned with maximizing money in­
come over time. The discussion in Chapter IV shows that this 
procedure misrepresents the goals and situation of some deci­
sion makers. 
Shackle says that: 
We decide on one particular course of action out 
of a number of rival courses of action because 
this one gives us, as an immediately present expe­
rience , the most enjoyment by anticipation of its 
outcome. (36, p. 10) 
He believes that choice is made between two rival courses of 
action by informal use of what he calls the "gambler indiffer­
ence map" (36, p. 30). Although the Shackle choice model can­
not be used in this dissertation, the Hurwicz game theoretic 
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criterion incorporates part of Shackle's ideas. 
Simon (38,.pp. 241-256) offers ideas which are of par­
ticular interest to those who are disturbed by the assumptions 
about the human organism required by other decision models. 
Assumptions regarding man's goals, abilities, knowledge and 
other attributes picture s very unreal individual. Simon 
tries to construct a decision model which is more consistent 
with actual human attributes and real life situations• He 
thinks that actual human rationality striving can only be an 
approximation of the kind of rationality implied by present 
models. 
Simon introduces modifications in choice rules which he 
thinks correspond to actual human behavior processes. His 
model provides for defining a rough set of alternative courses 
of action. The individual then examines each alternative 
sequentially to determine its implied outcome- This theory 
differs from others in that it assumes that individuals simply 
try to find alternatives with acceptable outcomes, rather than 
alternatives which maximize expected payoffs. An alternative 
is acceptable if it satisfies the decision maker's "aspiration 
level". The aspiration level may change in the course of 
examining alternatives. On the other hand, the first alterna­
tive action examined which allows a satisfactory payoff may 
be selected. 
15 
In addition to game theoretic models, the model for max­
imizing expected utilities is the only other model actually 
applied in this dissertation. However, elements of the 
Shackle model and the Simon model are present in the game 
theoretic criteria. The problem of quantifying utility is 
handled by holding other sources of utility constant and 
working with money income. 
The book, Decision Processes (39), contains reports on 
recent experimental work on individual psychology with re­
spect to uncertainty. Edwards (6) reports on similar activ­
ities . Dillon (5) has made a recent contribution in thst 
area. Friedman and Savage (?) have attempted to explain a 
few aspects of individual psychology in an uncertain environ­
ment. Such investigations help to increase understanding of 
individual reactions to uncertainty and provide a basis for 
making recommendations for actions under uncertainty. 
C. Alternative Approaches to Agricultural 
Uncertainty Problems 
This section is devoted to ideas closely associated with 
agricultural problems. However, the various approaches to 
uncertainty problems discussed are not unique to agriculture. 
Three approaches to uncertainty problems discussed are : 
(a) research to reduce uncertainty, (b) measures to "live 
with uncertainty", and (c) education to improve managerial 
abilities. 
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1. Research to reduce uncertainty 
Considerable resources are allocated to research designed 
to extend knowledge and understanding of natural phenomena-
Technological developments in plant and animal breeding, 
mechanization, irrigation and fertilization are part of the 
results of this research. These developments have increased 
man's .ability to control nature directly or to compensate 
for its uncontrollable variation. As a result, uncertainty 
has been reduced. 
Some attempts have been made to reduce uncertainty re­
sulting from sociological and institutional factors. Such 
attempts require research to determine the relationships of 
these factors to farm uncertainty and to devise ways of re­
ducing their effects. Notable proposals have been made for 
reducing price uncertainty through governmental action (10, 
24). These include proposals for forward prices, storage, 
cooperatives and credit institutions. Many of the laws of 
the land are designed to set bounds on business relation­
ships between individuals and groups of individuals - Govern­
mental agencies attempt to reduce uncertainty through stabil­
izing the national economy. The various models behind these 
activities have come from research and experience of social 
and physical scientists. 
Basic research has added to man's understanding of 
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physiological relationships. The concept of a production 
function, where output is a function of various inputs, has 
increased ability to predict the outcome of production. How­
ever, most production function work only includes controllable 
variables. Thus, yield predictions may differ from yields 
observed because of variation in inputs such as weather. 
Inclusion of weather, insect, and disease variables in pro­
duction functions would increase the predictive power of the 
function, providing that these variables can themselves be 
roughly predicted. 
The idea of statistical prediction of uncertain outcomes 
is prevalent in agricultural uncertainty literature (4, 10). 
The predictive models include "naive" models and complex 
econometric models. The "naive" models usually imply simple 
relationships between the event to be predicted and variables 
affecting it. Thus, they assume other than complete uncer­
tainty. Typical "naive" models Include use of averages, 
random outcomes, projections of the present, modes, linear 
trends, parallel periods, normal periods, outlook material 
and regression estimates for prediction (10, pp. 478-496). 
The econometric models are used to determine the interrelated 
effects of several variables on the object of prediction. 
An econometric model is considered useful for prediction if 
it has a high probability of success. The discussion in 
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Chapter IV shows that such a model has limited usefulness to 
some farmers. The "average11 model is the only one considered 
in empirical work in this dissertation. Knowledge of states 
of nature for the problems considered does not justify use of 
other models• However, the state of knowledge is subjective 
with individuals. Thus, some farmers may prefer to regard 
the problems as in the area of certainty or subjective risk 
rather than uncertainty. Other decision guides then become 
appropriate. 
2• Measures for "living with uncertainty" 
In addition to attempts to deal with uncertainty by im­
proving the basis of expectations, suggestions ere found in 
the literature (10, 24, 28) for adjusting plans to "live with 
uncertainty". These measures may be used to: (l) reduce 
income variability, (2) prevent returns from falling below 
some minimum level, or (3) increase the firm's ability to 
withstand unfavorable economic outcomes (10, p. 505) . Hart 
(8, p. 553) would add that In certain cases the level of re­
turns may be raised when certain precautions are used. 
Some farmers are in a position to follow plans which 
maximize returns over the long run. Precautions presented 
in this section are not necessarily used by them. The farmers 
may follow the scheme of selecting plans which have the 
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highest expected income over a period of years. The expected 
values may be based on long run averages or be derived from 
weighing possible outcomes by a priori or statistical prob­
abilities. Annual plans may be based on a prediction scheme, 
such as one of the "naive" models, in which the farmer has 
confidence. He may select enterprises such as cattle feed­
ing or invest in heavy fertilization or extensive mechaniza­
tion . Even though returns are low in some yesrs, they may be 
quite high in others. He can stay in business over the long 
run and expect to "come out ahead". Characteristics of such 
farmers are examined in Chapter IV. 
Other farmers may choose plans which offer income stabil­
ity between years. Enterprises may be selected which are re­
garded as "safe" because they nearly always return some min­
imum profit. This is the traditional explanation for farmers 
choosing dairying, beef breeding herds and poultry enter­
prises. Characteristics of such farmers are also discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
Another precaution for uncertainty is discounting. Even 
though the farmer has formulated expectations about the 
future, he may not treat them as if they are "single valued". 
In this case the discounting is not for time but for uncer­
tainty. The farmer discounts by reducing the value of his 
expectations by an amount which reflects his "degree of 
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belief11 in the expectations or protects him from serious 
losses. Plans are then geared to the discounted expectation. 
The effect is that more resources are required for a given 
output than original expectations imply or that the output 
expected for a given amount of resources is lower. Price 
discounting reduces the level of production which is planned. 
Discounting implies a conservative bias on the part of a 
farmer. 
Insurance and contracts of various kinds represent 
attempts to reduce adverse effects which may occur under un­
certainty. These devices are means of avoiding possible 
large losses by sacrificing returns in most years. In the 
case of Insurance, a nearly certain small loss is substituted 
for a small chance of a large loss. However, all types of 
uncertainty in agriculture are not formally insurable. Con­
tracts offer a means of shifting the risk of unfavorable 
events to other individuals willing or able to bear the con­
sequences. Thus, it is similar to insurance. The cost is 
giving up a chance to profit from favorable events. 
Diversification is one of the better known methods of 
meeting uncertainty. The diversification of interest here 
is not practiced to take advantage of complimentary produc­
tion relationships but to reduce Income variability. The 
idea is to: (a) combine enterprises whose production is not 
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highly correlated (i.e., with correlation coefficients - 0); 
(b) combine enterprises with low variance with more profit­
able ones having higher variances ; (c) Increase resource 
employment by adding enterprises with lower variance than 
present enterprises or low correlation with present enter­
prises . 
Heady (10, pp. 510-522) has outlined the conditions 
under which income variability will be decreased by diversi­
fication. In addition he and associates have provided esti­
mates of variances and correlations of various enterprises 
in Iowa (3, 12). The estimates provided are useful if the 
sample of yields or prices on which they are based are repre­
sentative of future yields and prices. 
Flexibility may be defined as the ability of a manager 
to adjust his plans as time passes to take advantage of addi­
tional information. Such changes can be made in most plans 
at some cost, thus the definition must be qualified by adding 
that the changes should, not result in prohibitive costs. 
For example, a change from Grade A dairying is quite costly 
if the facilities are highly specialized. The plan would be 
more flexible if the operation were Grade G with low cost or 
multiple use facilities. The cost of flexibility is low 
efficiency in "normal" or "average" years. 
Liquidity is another uncertainty precaution. It may be 
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regarded as a form of flexibility in that liquidity exists 
when assets can be transferred quickly, at low cost, into 
another asset form. Liquidity reserves for the farmer the 
opportunity to change his plan to take advantage of unexpected 
profitable alternatives. It also enables the farmer to "live 
through" unfavorable developments by converting liquid assets 
into funds to be used for family living and to pay annual 
fixed outlays. An Individual with a high equity ratio has 
greater liquidity, other things equal, than one with a low 
equity ratio. Legal or institutional equity restrictions are 
not so limiting. Thus, he has security for additional bor­
rowed funds. 
3. Education to improve managerial abilities 
Another activity of agricultural economists and other 
professional agricultural workers is education to improve 
managerial abilities. This activity is complimentary with 
others discussed In the two preceding sections. Farmers must 
know about precautions for uncertainty and have the data and 
knowledge necessary to predict outcomes. The required., know­
ledge comes through education designed to increase abilities 
to formulate problems and solve them. This requires training 
in techniques and concepts, and involves learning to reason 
both inductively and deductively. Another form of education 
comes from provision of data in forms which farmers can use. 
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The latter is emphasized in later sections of this disserta­
tion . 
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III. GAME THEORETIC TECHNIQUES 
The decision criteria discussed in this chapter are for 
use in a knowledge situation characterized by complete uncer­
tainty . Thus, they supplement the models adapted to risk and 
uncertainty situations presented in Chapter II. These cri­
teria, along with the model for maximizing utility, pre the 
only decision models which can be meaningfully applied to 
empirical problems by an individual other than the decision 
maker. That is, they are the only models providing an objec­
tive rule for obtaining an implied or explicit goal. Such 
models are normative rather than positive. 
A. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 
The game theoretic techniques are closely related to the 
two-person zero-sum game. Thus, the concepts involved in 
that problem are briefly reviewed. Luce and Half fa (29) and 
other authors (33) provide a very complete treatment of game 
theory. 
The two players, opposing each other in this type of 
game, each have a finite number of alternative courses of 
action called a strategy set. These sets are designated as 
follows: 
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( ) 
Si = ( a1} a2, . . . , am ) ana 
( ) 
Sg _ ( bi, bg, . . • , bn ) . 
S]_ is the strategy set for Flayer 1 and is made up of m 
strategies. Player 2 hss strategy set Sg composed of n 
strategies. The rule for the game is that each player has 
only one move (strategy choice) and the moves must be tsken 
simultaneously or in such a way thst neither player knows 
which strategy choice the other is using. Corresponding to 
each pair of strategies (one selected by each player) there 
is a payoff, Ojj . All possible pairs of strategies form a 
matrix of outcomes, (0±j) . The 0^ (i = 1, . . . , m and 
j = 1, . . • , n) entry in this matrix is the outcome of 
Player 1 choosing his 1th strategy and Player 2 choosing his 
,1th strategy. A payoff matrix appears as follows: 
Player 2 
Player ( b, bo b* ) 
1 ( ^ ^ ^ ) 
ai ( 3 5 1 ) 
( ) 
ag ( 6 —3 0 ) 
In the above game, choice of strategy ag by Player 1 and 
bg by Player 2 results in an outcome of -3. The outcomes may 
take on a wide variety of interpretations (29, pp. 57-58). 
For simplicity, they are simply regarded as dollars in this 
chapter. A minus sign means that Player 2 gains dollars and 
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Player 1 loses and conversely for a. positive sign. This char­
acterizes a "strictly competitive" game in which the players 
have "strictly opposing" preference patterns for the outcome 
of the game (29, p. 59). The outcomes are defined so that 
the gain of one player is the loss of the other. Thus, the 
game is zero sum. This relationship is apparent in the fol­
lowing section. 
1. The game solution 
What strategy choice should a player make to achieve the 
desired game outcome? Game theory does not attempt to say 
what he should do. It only points out the strategy a player 
can use to obtain the highest sure return or the lowest sure 
loss. This is called the "security level". Game theory 
gives procedures for determining the strategy which obtains 
the security level. The strategy may be a "pure strategy" 
requiring use of only one alternative course of action. A 
"mixed strategy" calls for using two or more courses„of action 
with given frequencies. This requires repeating the game a 
large number of times. In some cases, the strategies may 
not be mutually exclusive and a mixed strategy may be used in 
a single game. 
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2. Games with equilibrum pairs 
Consider the following game matrix: 
Player 2 
( ^  ) 
Player a-i ( 3 4 ) 
1 ( ) 
Sg ( 2 8 ) 
Assume that each player knows all the payoffs in this matrix 
and is trying to obtain the highest one possible. Each 
player must select his strategy not only by the outcome which 
it implies but also by what reasoning tells him his opponent 
may do. Player 1 can see that the highest sure payoff which 
he can receive is $3.00. This comes from using a^. Player 
2 can never lose more than $3.00 if he uses b^. In this 
game, $3.00 is the minimum in its row and the maximum in its 
column. The row and column represent a pair of strategies 
called an "equilibrum pair". The term, equilibrum, is applied 
because neither player has an incentive to change his strategy 
choice if the other does not. This is the solution to a game 
with a "saddle point", (i.e., Min. Ojj = Max. Ojj ; i = 1, 
. . .  m  a n d  j  =  1 ,  .  .  .  n ) .  T h e  s o l u t i o n  f o r  a  g a m e  w i t h  a  
saddle point is obtained by writing the minimum in each row 
beside the row and the maximum in each column below the 
column. The saddle point occurs where the minimum in a row 
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is also the maximum in a column. The equilibrum pair of 
strategies is given by the row and column in which the saddle 
point occurs. The solution is a pure strategy in this case. 
A player does not have to use the strategy specified by the 
solution; however, it is the only one assuring him a payoff 
of $5.00 or more,* regardless of what the other player does. 
A]_ assures Player 1 a maximum minimum payoff of #3.00 and is 
called his "maximin11 strategy ; bg is Player 21 s "minimax11 
strategy. Player 2 can do his worst to Player 1 by follow­
ing the minimax strategy. The maximin strategy is the best 
strategy against the worst Player 2 can do. 
3. Games without an equilibrum pair 
All games do not have equilibrum pairs. For example, 
the following matrix has no equilibrum pair. 
Player 2 
( ^ ^ ) 
Player a, ( 4 2  )  
1 1 ( ) 
ap ( 1 3 ) . 
Game problems such as the one above have led to the formula­
tion of a game solution which calls for a mixed strategy. 
The mixed strategy for a small matrix may be derived by use 
* "More ", in the case of Player 2, is actually a. lower 
level of loss. 
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of simple algebraic techniques. In the above game problem, 
Player 1 wants to maximize the outcome, V. To achieve this 
he must use his alternatives, a-j_ and a.g, in such proportions, 
p^ and p9, that if Player 2 uses bj, 
V = 4 p-j_ + 1 Po • ( 1) 
He also wants to use a^ and ap in such proportions, p^ and 
Pg, that, 
V = 2 p^ + 3 Pg . (2.) 
P}_ and pg are proportions; thus, 
pl + Pg = 1 • • (3) 
These three equations may be solved simultaneously to obtain: 
V = § = 4p^ + Ipg = (4) (1/2) + (l)(l/2) , and (4) 
V = § = 2pi + 3pg = (2) (1/2) + (3) (1/2) . (5) 
Equations 4 and 5 say that regardless of which strategy 
Player 2 uses, Player 1 can always receive 5/2 by playing 
(l/2a^, 1/2ag). Actually 5/2 is the minimum payoff which 
Player 1 can expect; however, the payoff may be greater than 
V. Thus, equations 1 and 2 can be written : 
V - 4p^ + lpg , and (6) 
V £ 2p1 + 3pg . (?) 
A similar procedure yields the mixed strategy, (q^ b^, 
qg bg), for Player 2 -  Player 2 wants to select a strategy 
that minimizes V because Player l's gains are his losses. 
Thus, he can minimize losses by minimizing V. The relation 
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to be fulfilled is as follows: 
V > 4q^ + 2qg (8) 
V ± lq^ + 3q . (9) 
Player 2's strategy is (l/4b^, 3/4bg) and the security level 
is 5/2• This is the same as the security level for Player 1 
because the game is zero-sum. 
Solutions for games with large payoff matrices may be 
obtained by use of the simplex method (11). Heady (9) and 
others (29, pp. 408-419) have presented procedures for con­
verting the game to a linear programming problem to be 
solved by use of the simplex method. The simplex procedure 
is used for solving empirical problems presented in later 
chapters. 
B. Games Against Nature 
The application of game theory in this study is to 
"games against nature11 (29, pp. 275-318). The problem 
visualized in a game against nature is that : 
A choice must be made from among acts a^, ag, 
. . . SJJJ but the relative desirability of each 
act depends upon which "state of nature" pre­
vails, either Sj, Sg, . . . sm- (29, p. 276) 
States of nature may be weather, disease, insects or other 
natural uncertainties which farmers face. The game against 
nature differs from true games in that the natural phenomenon 
is not necessarily a conscious adversary. Nature cannot be 
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said to have specific desires or goals which influence how 
it plays the game. 
Corresponding to each farmer set and each state of nature 
pair there is an outcome, 0^j. All possible pairs form a 
payoff matrix which is the same as described for true games. 
The problem is to choose a farmer strategy which will most 
nearly attain the goals specified for the resources involved. 
The strategy may be either pure or mixed. Most of the prob­
lems considered in this dissertation will allow a mixed 
strategy to be used in the playing of a single game. 
The knowledge situation for games against nature is 
taken to be complete uncertainty as to which state of nature 
will occur. Several criteria have been suggested for use in 
resolving the decision problem under uncertainty. Each pre­
scribes an optimal mode of behavior for the decision maker, 
providing he has the attributes implied by the criterion. 
The various criteria are used extensively in empirical prob­
lems presented in this dissertation. The criteria are dis­
cussed in the following pages. Emphasis is placed on the 
rules for obtaining solutions, the Implications of the cri­
teria and the relationship of the criteria with other deci­
sion models for imperfect knowledge situations. 
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1. Wald maximin criterion (15, 29, 39, 44) 
Assume a decision problem under uncertainty with acts 
Ai, Ag, . . • Am and States S^, Sg, . . . Sn. In using the 
Wald criterion, each act is assigned an index which is its 
security level. For the problem below, 2 is the security 
level for Aj_ and 1 is the security level for Ag. 
S1 S2 
AX ( 2 3 ) 
Ag ( 4 1 ) 
The Wald criterion rule is to choose the act with the highest 
index (security level). In the example used, A-j_ would be 
chosen. If a mixed strategy is possible for this example, 
the security level if 10/4 and the strategy is (3/4A^, l/4Ap). 
If the Aj_ are farmer strategies and the Sj are states 
of nature, the above example may be taken as a game In which 
a farmer is playing against nature. The solution rule cor­
responds exactly to that for a two-person zero-sum game. It 
was shown in previous discussion that the maximin strategy 
is the best strategy against the worst an opponent can do. 
Nature will not consciously do its worst against the farmer; 
thus, the Wald criterion is a conservative model for decision 
making under uncertainty. 
Few farmers believe that nature is trying to do its 
worst to them. However, many farmers may give serious 
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thought to the consequences which could result if the worst 
possible state of nature were to occur- The characteristics 
of such farmers are discussed in Chapter IV; however, it is 
instructive to mention a few such attributes in this section 
to show thst the Weld criterion is a useful model for deci­
sion making under uncertainty. 
A farmer with severely limiting resources might be forced 
out of business if a very unfavorable outcome occurs. How­
ever, the payoff which the wald criterion assures may be suf­
ficient to prevent loss of so many resources that the farmer 
cannot continue farming. In this case, the farmer would 
probably be willing to follow a plan suggested by the Wald 
criterion. Family responsibilities and dislike for chance-
taking may also cause a Wald solution to be used. 
The Wald criterion may suggest a farming plan similar to 
those suggested by various precautions for uncertainty dis­
cussed in Chapter II. In a problem requiring choice of 
alternative crops, a Wald mixed strategy would call for grow­
ing several crops to insure the highest security level. This 
is equivalent to diversification to insure s minimum income 
level each year. The Wald solution may also call for diversi­
fying inputs such as crop varieties or amounts of fertilizer. 
In appropriate problems, the Wald criterion may indicate that 
a practice such as contracting for purchases or sales allows 
the highest security level. Thus, it appears that use of the 
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Wald criterion has actually been advocated by farm management 
specialists for several years. 
2. Savage regret criterion (29, 35, 39) 
The Savage regret criterion is suggested by an analysis 
of the following decision problem under uncertainty. 
A l  ( 1 8  21 )  ( ) 
A% ( 1? 26 ) 
If Si is the true state of nature, the decision maker will 
have no "regret11 if he chooses A^, but will have regret if 
he chooses Ag. If Sg is the true state, he will have regret 
if he chooses A^, but will not if he chooses Ap. Savage (35) 
suggests defining the (negative) regret matrix, (V^j ), by 
Vij = °ij " MJX °kj * 
That is, form a new matrix, (j), by subtracting the 
maximum outcome in each column from each outcome in that 
column. This matrix, formed by use of the rule and the above 
example, is as follows: 
^1 ^2 
A, ( 0 -5 ) 
1 ( ) 
Ag ( -1 0 ) 
Each entry, r^j, in this matrix measures the difference be­
tween the payoff which actually is obtained and the payoff 
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which could have been obtained if the true state of nature 
had been known. The Wald solution rule is applied to the 
regret matrix to determine the strategy and the regret secu­
rity level. For the above example a pure strategy calls for 
use of Ag and the security level is 1. If a mixed strategy 
is allowed the maximum regret may be reduced to 5/6, 
The Savage criterion, like the Hurwicz and Laplace cri­
teria to be discussed, is not entirely suggested by game 
theory with which it Is associated. Elements of game theory 
are only used in setting up the problem and in obtaining a 
solution after the regret matrix is formed. The criterion 
implies a fundamental assumption about the way individuals 
plan under uncertainty. It assumes that they actually try to 
minimize regret. No empirical evidence is available to verify 
or reject this assumption. However, some plans suggested by 
the criterion are similar to plans actually followed by farm­
ers . 
Examples can be constructed in which farmers would not 
follow the Savage regret solution. For example, assume that 
the payoffs in the following example are dollar payoffs above 
variable costs. 
Si S2 S1 Sg 
Ai ( 18 21 ) Ax ( 0 -5 ) ( ) > ( ) 
Ag ( 17 26 ) Ag ( -1 0 ) 
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Consider a farmer situation where returns above variable costs 
must be $18.00 or more to pay fixed costs and pay for family 
living. If these expenses are not paid the farmer will be in 
severe difficulty. In such a situation, the possible $1.00 
regret from choosing Ag may be more important than the pos­
sible $5.00 regret from choosing A^. Thus, the Savage regret 
criterion would not be appropriate. 
Other examples could be constructed where the Savage 
criterion is quite appropriate. It may give solutions sim­
ilar to those suggested by a precaution for uncertainty such 
as insurance. Consider the following insurance problem: 
Barn Barn 
doesn't does 
burn burn 
S1 s2 S1 s2 
Do not insure A, ( 0 -5000 ) A-, ( 0 -4985 ) 
1 ( ) > 1 ( ) 
Insure Ag ( -15 -15 ) Ag ( -15 0 ) 
The minimum payoff in row A^ of the regret matrix is -4985 and 
in row Ag, -15. Thus, the farmer would insure if he follows 
the Savage regret criterion. Similar examples would show 
that a Savage solution calls for liquidity and flexibility. 
The Savage regret criterion yields a more conservative 
solution if mixed strategies are allowed. All weight is then 
not placed on the one regret which is the highest. Some im­
portance is attached to lower possible regret. In the fol­
lowing problem a strategy of (1/6 A%, 5/6 Ag) allows a lower 
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maximum regret and a higher security level in terms of dollar 
returns than is possible if only Ag is used. 
Si S2 Si Sp 
At (18 21 ) AT ( 0 -5 ) 
" ( ) ^ ( ) 
Ag ( 17 26 ) Ag ( -1 0 ) 
The minimum regret with a mixed strategy is 5/6 compared to 
a regret of 1 if Ag is used exclusively. In addition, a 
payoff level of 17.2, rather than 17, is assured. This 
property of the Savage regret criterion is further discussed 
in a later chapter. 
3. Hurwicz criterion (16, 29, 39) 
Hurwicz (16) proposes to look at the state having the 
best consequence and the state having the worst consequence 
in each row. For act A^, let m^ be the minimum and Mi the 
maximum of the outcomes in that row. Let a fixed number, , 
(0 - 4 - l) represent a given individual's pessimism index 
that the state giving mj_ will occur. Let (!-«•<) represent 
his belief that the state giving will occur. An index 
for each A^ is then computed as follows : 
«<m^+ ( 1 - ^  index for Aj_ • 
The act with the highest index is the preferred act. It 
is the strategy chosen by the Hurwicz criterion. 
Hurwicz suggested his criterion as an alternative to 
the more conservative Wald criterion. If «< = 1 the Hurwicz 
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criterion gives the same solution as the Wald. It pieces 
emphasis on both the worst and best consequences which can 
occur if A is not 0 or 1. This criterion is similar to 
Shackle's decision model in that the best and worst that can 
happen are assumed to be the only values important enough 
to warrant the decision maker's attention. The Hurwicz cri­
terion is not as easily applied as the other criteria because 
the <à must be supplied by the decision maker. 
The ok should not be interpreted as a decision maker's 
evaluation of the likelihood of various states of nature 
occurring. Suppose that a farmer has knowledge that S3, in 
the following matrix, is likely to occur and that S? is un­
likely to occur. 
S1 
Al ( 1 
A2 I 1 
A3 ( 1 
He may form the index, (.3) (0) + (l - .3)3, for Ag. How­
ever, the index for A^ must be (.3) (0) + (l - .3)8. This 
implies that 1 is more pessimistic about S3 occurring than 
Sg. The must be independent of states of nature to avoid 
inconsistency. 
Luce and Raiffa (29, pp. 282-283) suggest deriving the 
by a simple empirical problem. 
s2 s3 
8 0 ) 
0 3 ) 
) 
0 4 ) 
39 * 
s 
Si Sg % 
Ai ( 0 1 ) % 
( ) \ 
Ag ( x x ) l 
The <=^ index for Ax is 
(0) ^  + 1 (1 - -<) = 1 - ^ . 
The ^ index for Ag is ; 
X < = < + X ( 1 - C ^ )  = X .  
Luce and Raiffa suggest choosing an x such that A^ and Ag are 
indifferent. The decision maker must specify an x such that 
x = 1 - °< . If x, a sure return, must be relatively high, 
then =k will be relatively small. This may indicate a prefer­
ence for gambling on a higher return. It may also represent 
the situation of a decision maker who must have a high return 
to stay in the game and who must gamble. If the x is rela­
tively low, the relevant case may be a decision maker who 
prefers not to gamble. It may also be characteristic of an 
individual who needs a particular level of return so intensely 
that he emphasizes it above all else. It has been noted pre­
viously that with «•< = 1, the Hurwicz criterion is the same 
as the Wald pure strategy criterion. This may be interpreted 
as an extreme case of distaste for gambling or need for a 
given level of return. Any of these descriptions of indi­
vidual psychology or resource situations could characterize 
some farmers. Thus, the Hurwicz criterion is deemed appli­
cable to farmer problems. 
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4. Laplace criterion (29, 39) 
The Laplace criterion is based on the "principle of in­
sufficient reason11 (29, o. 284) . In terras of the problem 
considered here, that principle states that if one is "com­
pletely ignorant" as to which state of nature will occur, 
then one should behave as if all are equally likely. The 
decision problem under uncertainty is essentially treated 
as a risk problem with each state being assigned equal prob­
abilities. An expected outcome based on these probabilities 
is computed for each Aj_. The procedure is equivalent to 
averaging each act across states of nature. The act with 
the highest average is the strategy chosen by the Laplace 
criterion. 
If enough states of nature are considered, the Laplace 
criterion is the average "naive" model. Many recommendations 
made by research and extension workers are based on the aver­
age model. Thus, the Laplace criterion is implicitly used 
r 
in many farming decisions. It is an appropriate model if 
the decision maker can stay in farming long enough to realize 
the average expected. 
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IV. THE FARMER DECISION PROBLEM 
The choice models outlined in Chapters II and III sug­
gest a number of ways of resolving farming decision problems. 
Vvhich model should a given farmer select? This question can 
only be answered authoritatively after a careful analysis of 
the setting in which the problem is framed. Some indication 
was given in preceding chapters of the circumstances under 
which particular decision models are most appropriate. This 
chapter is devoted primarily to further analysis of factors 
which affect the problem setting. The nature of the factors' 
effects on uncertainty are given particular emphasis. 
A. General Formulation of a Farmer Decision Problem 
A general statement of a farmer decision problem helps 
to point out important components of the problem. In order 
for a decision to be required, the farmer must have alterna­
tive courses of action. These courses of action may be 
thought of as a set; A%, Ag, . . . Am. The size of the set, 
m, is limited by known and available technology. It is also 
limited by the resources which the farmer will devote to the 
particular activity in question. Thus, the set of courses 
of action may be different for every farmer. 
For a given problem, a set of conditions, Sj_, Sg, . . . 
Sn, which could prevail during the period of interest, can 
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be specified. Conditions of interest may be thought of as 
states or levels of variables which may influence the outcome 
of alternative farmer acts. They may be states of nature 
such as were referred to in the game theoretic chapter. 
Alternatively, they may be possible courses of action of 
other individuals with whom the farmer is competing. Most 
of these conditions are not predictable or controllable by 
the farmer. The degree to which they are determines whether 
certainty, risk or uncertainty prevails• The conditions that 
may exist during the period in which a plan is carried out 
are further discussed in a later section of this chapter. 
For each alternative course of action, there is an out­
come which is determined by the condition that prevails dur­
ing the period the action is effective. The game theory dis­
cussion showed how a matrix of possible outcomes may be con­
structed by considering all possible pairs of Aj_ and Sj_. In 
order to reach this stage in problem formulation, the farmer 
must gather and organize available knowledge and specify 
alternative courses of action. Finally, he must estimate 
possible outcomes of alternative plans. Problem solving 
steps remaining are selecting a course of action and putting 
the plan in action. Obviously, a farmer must accept the con­
sequences of his choice. 
The following analysis of factors affecting decisions 
help to explain or anticipate the decision which a farmer 
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makes. Professional agricultural workers must be cognizant 
of possible problem settings If they are to provide data and 
recommendations which are of maximum use for farmers. The 
following setting analysis is designed to broaden their under­
standing of farmer circumstances. 
B. Analysis of Problem Setting Components 
A problem setting may be described by analysis of the 
following variables: (a) alternative courses of action 
allowed by a particular farmer's resource situation and known 
technology; (b) characteristics of the farmer, including his 
psychology, family situation and work preference; and (c) the 
knowledge situation with respect to states of nature and other 
conditions. It is evident that a description of these vari­
ables would not be the same for all farmers. 
1. Alternative courses of action 
Most farmers are aware of crops adapted to their local­
ity. They also know which classes of livestock can utilize 
available feed. Research and extension workers are generally 
proficient in listing physical possibilities for using re­
sources and are familiar with existing technology. Thus, 
they are able to specify alternative cultural practices, 
feeding practices, machinery combinations, varieties, breeds 
and construction techniques. Any of the above may be the 
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subject of choice in a farmer decision problem. In general, 
a farmer, and advisors working with him, should have no dif­
ficulty in specifying alternative courses of action. The 
critical point is whether sufficient effort is actually de­
voted to listing relevant, technically possible alternatives. 
From technically possible alternatives, a farmer must choose 
those which his resources allow. The resource position may 
affect decisions in other ways discussed in the following 
section, 
2. Characteristics of individual farmers 
The theory of choice attempts to explain or predict 
human behavior by combining preference structures and physical 
possibilities into one model. Preference structures are re­
flected by ends or goals. Resource limitations and technology 
determine physical possibilities and may be thought of as 
means of obtaining goals or ends. The resource situation 
may also affect the goals which farmers make known. This 
section is devoted to an examination of goals which farmers 
may have and to an analysis of factors which influence selec­
tion of those goals. This section has considerable influence 
on choice of relevant decision models in this dissertation. 
a. Farmer goals. The goal most often attributed to 
farmers is to maximize returns over a relatively long period 
of time. This is the goal Implied by the average "naive" 
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model and the probability (risk) model discussed in Chapter 
II. As was indicated there, the concept is to maximize util­
ity , but in empirical applications, utility is usually con­
sidered to be a function of money. The goal of maximizing 
dollar returns is an intermediate one which is necessary for 
the end of obtaining consumable goods and services. Discus­
sion in this section shows that farmers cannot always act as 
though profit maximization over time is their objective. 
Some farmers prefer to consume a part of their resources 
directly. For example, they may "consume" family labor in 
the form of leisure or vacations. Farmers who have strong 
work preferences tend to choose enterprises or practices 
which involve the tasks they enjoy most. Thus, a farmer 
may choose dairying even though feeding hogs is more profit­
able. Some enterprises provide other forms of satisfaction 
which lead to choice of those enterprises rather than other 
feasible ones. Thus, decision models designed to maximize 
money income over time are not appropriate for use of all 
farmers. 
A particular value system is often attributed to farmers. 
For example, it is sometimes suggested that the goal of farm 
ownership Is motivated not only by a desire for security but 
also by a sincere belief that an individual should be a 
"steward of the soil". Debt may be avoided because It is 
thought to be an unfavorable reflection on character. Farmers 
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with this type of value system may follow quite inflexible 
farming systems because vacilation in farming is "bad". 
These value judgments may result in plans which are clearly 
inconsistent with profit maximization. 
The possible farmer characteristics discussed above may 
be appropriate to various decision models if outcomes are 
properly defined. Thus, even though the practical difficul­
ties are great, various farmer problems can conceptually be 
resolved by the techniques discussed in this dissertation. 
A different situation exists if outcomes cannot be modified 
so that given decision models are relevant as a guide to 
choice. The problem then is not in defining outcomes but in 
choosing models which are consistent with the desired goals. 
The following farmer situations lead to farmer goals which 
may be obtained by following only one or a few of the deci­
sion models discussed in this study. 
b. Farmer situations affecting choice of decision models. 
Various psychological traits may have considerable influence 
on decisions. For example, the need for financial security 
is a trait which varies between farmers. This trait affects 
a farmer's attitude toward chance-taking. To some, taking a 
chance is a source of satisfaction. In that case, high risk 
enterprises may be selected because of a chance for high 
profits and for the satisfaction of gambling. Most farmers 
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probably have some degree of "risk aversion" (10, pp. 550-
557). This indicates a distaste for gambling or an Inability 
to gamble due to resource restrictions. 
The psychology of an individual with regard to risk is 
affected by his age, equity position and family situation. 
A young farmer may gamble in fanning because he has much to 
gain and few resources to lose. In the event of unfavorable 
outcomes, his age allows the opportunity to start over in 
business. A farmer with a. family must provide for their liv­
ing (if it suits his value system) and is often forced to be 
conservative. 
A farmer with a strong equity position can withstand 
losses in a few years and recover them in other years. Severe 
capital restrictions may prevent a farmer from adopting plans 
which would be most profitable in the long run. He would 
not be willing to risk the short run chance of resource 
depletion and severe financial hardship. 
A farmer's tenure arrangement is part of his general 
resource situation. He may be an owner with various amounts 
of equity, an owner-renter, or a cash, share or partnership 
renter. Renters with short term leases have uncertainty as 
to how long they will be on the farm. This situation may 
lead to plans which are not most profitable In the long run. 
Such a plan is followed to assure an acceptable income level 
each year rather than an acceptable average income over a 
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period of years. The annual payment of a cash renter may 
necessitate a plan which assures payment of the required rent. 
Share tenants must sometimes take landlord preferences into 
account. The landlord may prefer a stable income each year 
rather than a higher, variable income over several years. 
The importance of a decision in terms of possible mag­
nitudes of desirable or undesirable consequences may also 
affect choice. A farmer may be classified as conservative 
because he follows a plan for his main enterprise which 
assures a minimum income level each year. However, he may 
use a few resources In a risky enterprise because he has 
little to lose and may make a substantial profit. Thus, it 
is important to determine the critlcalness of a decision when 
suggesting solutions to farmer problems. 
A decision required only once or a few times in a life­
time may be made quite differently than one repeated many 
times. A "one time11 decision is often quite important. For 
example, an individual usually purchases a farm only once. 
Decisions to purchase high cost machinery or buildings are 
only made a few times in a lifetime. Some farmers could not 
base plans on an average expectation if the plan is irrevoc­
able. An unfavorable outcome might force the farmer into 
severe financial stress or out of business. 
The situations affecting farmer goals (and thus his 
decisions) are highly interrelated. The effect of one situ­
ation is conditioned by the state of another. Thus, the pre­
ceding discussion has resulted in overlapping ideas in sev­
eral places. Present understanding of farmer goals is rela­
tively limited. Extension or research personnel can probably 
discover additional important farmer characteristics affect­
ing decisions. However, the presentation here should broaden 
the basis for making farmer recommendations. In Chapter V, 
the various farmer situations discussed are used in specify­
ing relevant choice models for the farmer problems considered 
in empirical chapters. 
3. The knowledge situation 
It is well known that decisions are made with various 
amounts of information. Data relevant to a particular prob­
lem may come from several sources. It comes from other 
farmers, a wide assortment of publications and professional 
agricultural workers with various amounts of technical train­
ing. The data which a given farmer has is a function of the 
sources he uses and the amount each can supply. It is assumed 
in this study that the farmer is very thorough in gathering 
information or that extension personnel take the initiative 
in supplying data. Thus, the problem of obtaining data is 
not considered in this section. 
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The problem faced is that of analyzing available data 
and determining its adequacy for use in planning future 
actions. Even when other aspects of the problem are iden­
tical, the knowledge situation may differ between farmers 
because of the subjective nature of its evaluation. Thus, 
it is important to analyze the knowledge situation for indi­
vidual farmers or groups of farmers when choosing decision 
models on which to base recommendations. 
The very infrequent case of perfect knowledge of produc­
tion processes and the future is only briefly treated. In 
the case of "certainty", the set of future conditions is re­
duced to one unique condition. The farmer can simply compare 
alternative actions on the basis of how nearly they obtain 
his goal and select the optimum one. If a farmer thinks he 
knows enough about the future to have "single valued expecta­
tions", the same procedure is applicable. However, expecta­
tions may be discounted before applying choice criteria. 
Other degrees of knowledge range from risk through un­
certainty. This implies that there is a set composed of more 
than one possible condition which can prevail. The condi­
tions which must be considered vary between problems. In 
production problems, they are unpredictable and uncontrollable 
variables which affect output or profit. For example, crop 
production is affected by weather variables, insects and 
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disease. Weather influences livestock production directly 
by affecting the feed efficiency and indirectly by affecting 
feed production. In addition, feed efficiencies and rates 
of gain vary because of unobservable and unpredictable dif­
ferences in animals fed in different years. Thus, the farmer 
is not always able to predict feed requirements or the date 
animals will reach a given market grade or weight. It is 
also well known that exact prices cannot be predicted accu­
rately . In a. risk or uncertainty situation, several price 
levels may be regarded as possible. All possible combinations 
of prices and natural factors form the set of conditions. 
The outcome of investment decisions is affected by prices 
and technological change. Thus, all combinations of these 
form the future possible conditions. 
Some farmer problems involve competition with another 
individual such as s landlord, a salesman or s buyer. In 
that case, the outcome of a course of action is affected by 
a set composed of alternative actions of a competitor. This 
is a true two-person game situation. The game criterion is 
strictly applicable because the competitor can be assumed 
to be trying to do his best for himself and his worst to the 
farmer. This involves implied assumptions that the farmer 
knows alternative courses of action of his competitor and 
that the competitor will act rationally. Some might argue 
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that the farmer competes with all other farmers in markets. 
However, Dillon (5) has shown that, since farming is largely 
pure competition, the farmer may regard the price situation 
as a "state of nature11. All other farmers are not actively 
trying to do their worst to one farmer. 
Specification of a set of possible conditions is im­
portant for a number of reasons. For one thing, the farmer 
must know possible outcomes in order to make a decision which 
fits his individual situation. That is, he must not only 
know averages but minimum outcomes as well. The set of con­
ditions is also helpful in stratifying available data. The 
procedure of considering alternative "states of nature" dis­
courages combination of data generated from very different 
conditions. For example, cron yield data from experiments 
conducted in different years would be considered outcomes of 
different states of nature but possibly the same course of 
action (e.g., fertilizers, cultural practices, etc.). The 
suggested problem formulation indicates that data should 
reflect the effects of many states of nature. 
Once the matrix of outcomes is determined, the farmer 
may reduce it by deciding that his predictive powers are 
adequate to allow Ignoring some possible conditions. That 
is, he may decide that some states of nature (columns) are 
not important enough to consider. He may be confident enough 
in his knowledge to attach probabilities to conditions and 
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treat the problem as one of risk. This decision may very be­
tween farmers. It depends on his subjective interpretation 
of the knowledge situation and his ability to withstand the 
effects of being wrong. Various techniques for handling the 
set of conditions for particular problems is discussed in 
later chapters. 
C. Role of Research and Extension in the 
Problem Solving Process 
The problem statement and analysis of factors affecting 
its solution could provide a useful guide to research and 
extension workers. The discussion gives a broad perspective 
of the problem which may influence the activities of profes­
sional agricultural workers. This section includes a brief 
summary of present and past work in the area of providing 
assistance to decision makers. Suggestions are also made 
for possible adjustments in the future. 
Agricultural workers have devoted considerable effort 
to providing data and recommendations to farmers. Most im­
portant farmer decision problems have been given some atten­
tion. Data provided are usually averages or point estimates. 
For example, estimates of average yields, average input re­
quirements and average prices are available for s wide range 
of activities. Although there are notable exceptions, little 
attention has been given to other parameters of yield or 
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price distributions such as variance, range or skewness. 
Good reasons exist for the kinds of data and recommenda­
tions which have been provided to farmers in the past. For 
many years (and even now in some areas) agricultural technical 
knowledge was very limited. Farmer technical knowledge was 
even more meager. Emphasis was logically placed on providing 
data of some kind, even if it represented point estimates 
of input-ouput coefficients relating to one year. Very little 
data were available which reflected the effects of uncontrol­
lable variables. However, careful researchers described the 
exact situation being reported so that farmers could recog­
nize data limitations• Technological development in agri­
culture has been so rapid that a shortage of data represent­
ing replication over time still exists. With each innova­
tion, old research is often discontinued and new started. 
Research staff turnover and other administrative problems 
often limit the length of a particular research project. 
Difficulties of the above kind are virtually unpreventable 
and inadequate data naturally result. 
Very often a decision has been made to derive data for 
other purposes than farmer decision making. For example, 
basic research has been conducted to advance knowledge of 
plant and animal physiology. Presumably, the results of 
such research are then used in more applied work which is 
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directly useful to farmers. Such decisions have probably 
been sound. Agricultural research in these areas has made a 
great contribution to national and agricultural productivity. 
Basic research will and should be continued- However, at 
some point, the marginal value of research resources in 
that area may be less than the marginal returns from resources 
used to provide specialized data for particular farmer situ­
ations . 
In some instances, the limitation of data to be used 
for farmer planning is the result of a narrow perspective of 
farmer problems and goals. The farmer is often assumed to 
be trying to maximize profit over time. This leads to the 
conclusion that averages over time are adequate as farmer 
expectations. On the other hand, over-zealous suggestions 
for diversification tend to emphasize the desire for income 
stability. Emphasis on mechanization to reduce average costs 
overlooks the value of liquidity and in some cases flexibil­
ity. The treatment of the problem in the preceding section 
should broaden appreciation of differences in farmer goals 
and, thus, the plans they wish to follow. 
In the present agricultural research and education set­
ting, data and recommendations can be Improved. One way is 
to make several recommendations, each implying a different 
goal or resource situation. In that way, farmers may choose 
recommendations which suit their own situation. Research 
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plans may include consideration of the value of the data for 
planning in addition to its specific scientific purpose. In 
many cases, adjustments may be made in experiments which cost 
little but provide additional data for decision making. 
Data which were generated for one purpose are often adaptable 
for other purposes. This requires that the researcher know 
the kinds of Information needed. 
The actual farmer decision problems treated in this dis­
sertation demonstrate ways of using available date and im­
proving recommendations. Techniques are shown for adapting 
data to farmer needs. The plans resulting from application 
of alternative decision criteria are shown. These plans may 
be published as a variety of recommendations which are 
applicable in various fprmer situations. In addition, the 
problems considered are ones about which research and exten­
sion personnel are frequently counseled. The techniques 
demonstrated may thus be directly adopted by such workers. 
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V. PROCEDURE FOR APPLICATION AND EVALUATION 
OF ALTERNATIVE DECISION MODELS 
Preceding chapters provide the background and technical 
knowledge required for assisting farmers with decision prob­
lems. The knowledge situations which may characterize deci­
sion models have been discussed. Various models which may 
be used in making the required decision have been presented. 
Of these, only the game theoretic models, the "naive" models 
and the probability (risk) model can be used normatively. 
The others either only attempt to explain how decisions are 
made (positive models) or are subsumed by the normative 
models mentioned above. Chapter IV has shown that several 
factors may affect the desired outcome of a decision. The 
procedure used in examining empirical problems in Chapters 
VI and VII is reviewed in this chapter. However, the im­
portance of this chapter is in demonstrating a technique for 
bringing problem setting components and alternative decision 
models together to form a systematic procedure for deriving 
solutions to actual farmer problems. 
A. Farmer Problems Considered 
The farmer decision problems treated in the following 
chapters are limited to individual ones within the whole farm 
plan. For example, they include choice of crop varieties, 
fertilizer rates, pasture mixtures and stocking rates. 
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Obviously, such problems imply that a decision has already 
been made to devote some level of resources to a particular 
farming alternative. Such within farm or within enterprise 
decision problems are emphasized because they are convenient 
for demonstrating problem formulation and techniques of 
applying criteria. 
It is not entirely unrealistic to consider farmer prob­
lems which are a part of the overall farm management task. 
Extension and research personnel are often asked for advice 
concerning enterprises and other within farm problems- In 
fact, very little of their time and effort is spent on whole 
farm problems= In some geographical areas, a few enter­
prises are clearly most profitable- In that case the man­
agement task is simply choice of input levels and technology. 
As was seen in Chapter IV, personal preferences and the re­
source situation often dictate which enterprises are selected 
Decisions are then only required for how much, when and how. 
Most of the problems considered deal with technical un­
certainty. In most cases prices are assumed known. This 
assumption is good for crops for which price supports exist. 
However, livestock prices can not be predicted very accu­
rately • In that case price uncertainty is probably a larger 
problem to the farmer than technical uncertainty. Time and 
other resources available for this study limited the number 
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of problems studied and the choice was made to study technical 
aspects of uncertainty problems. Dillon (5) has demonstrated 
the application of game theoretic methods to price uncer­
tainty problems in livestock production. 
B. Problem Settings Hypothesized and 
Decision Models Applied 
In order to analyze the appropriateness of alternative 
decision criteria, it is necessary to compare the outcomes 
which may result from using the criteria with the outcomes 
desired by farmers. It has been shown that the outcomes de­
sired by a farmer depend on his particular problem setting. 
Thus, it is necessary to specify the problem setting in order 
to arrive at relevant farmer goals. 
The many factors which affect decisions can occur in a 
number of combinations. Each combination can technically be 
called a unique problem setting. Thus, a large number of 
problem settings could be considered. In order to keep this 
study within manageable size, it is necessary to hypothesize 
a limited number of problem settings. Actually only two are 
considered. However, these are general enough to encompass 
a number of combinations of factors which affect goals. 
The first problem setting is characterized by a situ­
ation in which a farmer can act as though he is to maximize 
income over a long period of time. This setting may imply 
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a multitude of farmer characteristics. For example, the 
farmer's goal may be to maximize income over time. That goal 
may not be feasible unless his resource situation allows him 
to absorb losses in some years and regain them in others. 
That is, he must be able to survive over a period long 
enough that observed values approach expected values. Inter­
temporal substitution of funds may be achieved by borrowing 
on equity or using cash reserves. However, this requires 
the managerial and personal characteristics necessary to plan 
and carry out such substitution. In the past many farmers 
have essentially followed a plan to maximize income over time. 
The recurrence of farmer stress in unfavorable periods and 
opulence in favorable years indicates that farmers have some 
difficulty in achieving intertemporal transfer of income. 
Other factors leading to this problem setting were dis­
cussed in Chapter IV. The farmer must have a particular 
psychology with regard to risk. He should not receive lower 
satisfaction from experiencing losses in some years compared 
with the satisfaction he obtains from stable, though lower, 
income every year. This problem setting may occur when an 
unfavorable outcome has unimportant negative effects on the 
farmer's economic well being. It may also occur when one 
farmer course of action clearly dominates all others. 
Several decision criteria may be appropriate for planning 
long run profit maximization. If the knowledge situation is 
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one of complete uncertainty the Laplace criterion may be used. 
This criterion says to average outcomes for each farmer 
alternative over states of nature. The course of action 
with the highest average is chosen. This criterion is 
applied to each problem in the empirical analysis. 
The average model mentioned previously is also applicable 
to this problem setting. It cells for following a plan which 
maximizes the expected value of a probability distribution 
of outcomes. The outcomes are assumed to have equal prob­
abilities. Thus, the expected value is the average (arith­
metic mean) of past outcomes which have resulted from various 
states of uncertain, uncontrollable inputs and constant levels 
of known, controllable inputs. The inference is that past, 
observed outcomes are a random sample from a population of 
possible outcomes. The sample average is assumed to be an 
unbiased estimate of the population mean. If the assumption 
is true, a farmer can maximize long run profits by choosing 
the alternative plan which has the preferred (highest, least 
costly, etc.) outcome. He must be able to continue in farming 
long enough to experience a sample of outcomes which averages 
out to the expected value-
It can be seen that the average model described above 
is similar to the Laplace criterion. Theoretically, the 
Laplace criterion calls for considering all possible states 
of nature. However, in practice, the states of nature in-
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eluded must be limited to those for which data are available. 
For the empirical problems studied le ter, this is equivalent 
to considering only the outcomes which have been observed in 
the past. Few identical states of nature occur, thus no 
weighting problem arises which might cause the average model 
and the Laplace criterion to differ. 
If used in a slightly different manner than outlined 
above, the average model may give a different solution than 
the Laplace. The average model may be used to formulate 
expectations of states of nature on which to base plans. 
For example, expectations for rainfall may be formed by 
averaging past rainfall. The average rainfall might be re­
garded as certain ("single valued expectation") and a plan 
devised to fulfill all the marginal conditions (14) for max­
imizing profits. The plan resulting may call for resource 
uses not previously visualized as alternatives. However, 
if care is taken in specifying alternatives this difficulty 
will not occur. It will also not occur in a problem for 
which resource use alternatives are not continuously vari­
able. That is, when there is a finite set of discrete 
alternatives. 
In practice, the difference between the models would 
seldom be great. Frequently, data are available for only 
a few farmer alternatives -, thus, both models would consider 
the same courses of action. If empirically derived produc­
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tion functions are available which include uncertain vari­
ables , the average may suggest a different plan. The Laplace 
model is regarded as a substitute for the average model in 
this dissertation. 
If the knowledge situation permits, a farmer in a prob­
lem setting which allows long run profit maximization may 
wish to treat the problem as one of risk. Estimates of the 
probability of uncontrollable conditions occurring are neces­
sary if the probability (risk) model is to be used. In addi­
tion, the farmer must have enough confidence in the prob­
abilities to use them for planning. The probability model 
uses the concept of maximizing expected values (income) . 
The average model is actually a special case of the probabil­
ity model in which the weights applied to past outcomes are 
1/n.w The probabilities used in obtaining expected values 
for the probability model may be any value, O^Ps-1. The 
alternative with the highest expected value is the one 
chosen. 
Probabilities of various natural factors which affect 
outcomes of farmer decisions can often be estimated. For 
example, a frequency distribution can be constructed for 
rainfall by using available weather records. The assumption 
•*n is the number of past outcomes used to estimate the 
mean of a. population of possible outcomes. 
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is required that future weather will be like the psst. In 
the following example, rainfall is grouped into three cate­
gories: 
Weather 
Good Average Bad 
Farmer A 50 30 15 
alternatives 
B 45 35 20 
C 35 35 25 
Assume that the probability of good weather is .2; average 
weather, .55; and, bad, .25. The expected outcomes for each 
alternative are as follows: 
A: 50(.2) + 30(.55) + 15(.25) = 30.25 
B: 45(.2) + 35(.55) + 20(.25) = 33.25 
C: 35( .2) + 35( . 55) + 25( .25) = 32.5 
Alternative B is the one selected by the probability model. 
That is, it would be expected that alternative B would be the 
most profitable over the long run. This model is applied to 
only one empirical problem. It is the only problem for which 
probabilities can be computed. In most problems s state of 
nature is simply identified by a year. The year is a com­
posite state of nature which expresses the state of many 
natural uncertain variables. A joint probability distribu­
tion of all those variables would be nearly impossible to 
construct. 
The second general problem setting considered in 
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empiric al chapters is one in which farmers must consider the 
short run level of returns. As was true with the preceding 
problem setting, several individual and problem character­
istics lead to this setting. The fermer under consideration 
may be a very conservative individual. He may feel great 
dissatisfaction from experiencing losses or may get little 
satisfaction from gambling on a high return. The farm family 
may have goals which require a minimum income level each year. 
For example, they may wish to buy appliances, improve the 
home or have a vacation each year. They would not be willing 
to follow a farming plan which leaves a chance of foregoing 
those items. The amount of resources available may offset 
the pressure of family needs. If resources are unlimited, 
income floors can be set at any level. Family responsibil­
ities differ between farmers so that two farmers having the 
same resources may select different plans. One may plan for 
long run profit maximization and the other for a minimum in­
come level. A "one time11 decision may also lead to this prob­
lem setting. However, no one time decisions are considered 
in this study. Some types of rental arrangements cause this 
setting. 
The most severe problem setting requiring attention to 
income variability between years might include all the fac­
tors mentioned - psychology, resource position, family re­
sponsibility and rental arrangement. In other cases only 
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a few of the factors may be important. Since the degree to 
which each restricts planning varies, one would expect to 
find farmers who take income variability into account in 
different ways. Thus, the decision problems appropriate to 
this problem setting may be used in conjunction with deci­
sion models appropriate for long run profit maximization. 
That is, one model may be used on one problem and another 
on a different problem. 
The Wald criterion is appropriate for choosing a plan 
which assures a minimum income level each year. It may or 
may not reduce income variability but is sure to skew the 
direction of variation toward higher incomes. A very con­
servative farmer might follow the Wald criterion regardless 
of his resource position. However, a farmer would not neces­
sarily follow it because of acute resource restrictions. He 
might be willing to gamble and accept the consequences. The 
wald criterion is applied to each of the farmer problems in 
following chapters. 
It is not deemed necessary to consider other more tradi­
tional models for behavior under uncertainty. The Wald cri­
terion subsumes such actions as diversifying, choosing low 
risk activities and providing for flexibility. It might also 
suggest liquidity in an appropriate problem. Thus, the Wald 
criterion, with both pure and mixed strategies, is the only 
choice model used explicitly for this problem setting. In 
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the following section, situations in which the Hurwicz and 
Savage regret criteria pre applicable to this problem setting 
are indicated. 
C. Other Decision Models and Their Application 
The Hurwicz and Savage regret criteria are not uniquely 
applicable to either of the problem settings discussed in 
this chapter. It is shown here that they have properties 
which may suit them to either setting. The outcome of using 
the criteria depends primarily on the characteristics of the 
problem and the farmer. 
As was shown in Chapter III, the pessimism-optimism 
index, «•< , reflects the willingness or ability of a particular 
farmer to take chances. A low causes the farmer to weigh 
favorable outcomes heavily. A plan results which may subject 
the farmer to a low income in some years. This requires a 
problem setting allowing long run profit maximization. How­
ever, the plan may not be the same as that suggested by the 
Laplace criterion. The Hurwicz criterion with a relatively 
small may not select the plan with the highest average. 
Thus, the inference is that a farmer using the Hurwicz with 
an very near zero is gambling on a distribution of states 
of nature other than one in which states are equally likely. 
In empirical work, the Hurwicz solution, using a very small 
JL, is called the "gambling plan". 
68 
The Hurwicz solution with a range of <=( including 0 calls 
for an alternative which allows a maximum minimum income level 
each year- It places emphasis on the possible adverse effects 
of a highly unfavorable outcome. It gives the same plan as 
the Wald pure strategy. If the range of does not include 
0, some emphasis is placed on the possibility of obtaining a 
high return. In that case the Hurwicz plan may be less con­
servative than that of the Wald. . It fits a problem setting 
between the two extremes considered in this chapter. In the 
discussion of empirical problems, this non-extreme plan is 
frequently indicated. 
The Hurwicz. criterion has a property which suits it to 
dynamic planning. It is possible to change the <=< each year 
to suit the farmer situation. A farmer may start with an 
which fits his problem setting. If he experiences favorable 
outcomes, he may change the to allow more gambling. If a 
series of unfavorable outcomes occur, he may change to a 
large «=* until he gets to a better resource position. The 
other criteria do not allow the farmer such flexibility ; 
however, he may change criteria between years. 
The Savage regret criterion does not necessarily fall 
into either problem setting. It gives no indication of the 
psychology or resource situation of the farmer. It only 
implies that the farmer wants to minimize the regret he might 
have from choosing a less profitable plan. The regret may be 
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of two kinds. It may result from having missed an opportunity 
for a very high return or from having fallen below a, minimum 
sure income. Nothing about the criterion says which will be 
the greatest. In the case of a mixed strategy, the two re­
grets may both be given weight. This may result in a solu­
tion which fits a problem setting between the two hypothesiz­
ed. It is necessary to examine the problem to determine which 
problem setting the Savage regret solution implies. Various 
possible outcomes besides regret are computed for the Savage 
regret plan to facilitate examination of the appropriateness 
of the plan. 
D. Analytical Format for Empirical Chapters 
Empirical work is presented in two chapters. Various 
crop problems are examined in Chapter VI and pasture and live­
stock problems are presented in Chapter VII. The technique 
of using various decision models and the solution resulting 
from their use are both emphasized. The procedure for each 
problem is as follows: 
(a) The farmer problem being considered is discussed. 
(b) The source and treatment of data is reviewed and the 
problem is formulated in the manner suggested in 
Chapter IV. 
(c) The problem solution and possible outcomes are 
presented in table form. 
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(d) The applicability of plans to problem settings 
hypothesized is determined. Various possible out­
comes are examined to show the possible results of 
using the plan over a period of years. 
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VI. PLANNING CROP ENTERPRISES UNDER IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE 
Three typical crop problems are studied in this chapter. 
The first problem discussed is choice of crop varieties. 
Next, the problem of choosing the amount and kind of ferti­
lizer to use on a given crop is considered. Finally, a prob­
lem requiring choice of alternative crops is examined. The 
pro Diem analysis is designed to achieve several objectives 
of this study, (a) It demonstrates procedures for applying 
alternative decision models. (b) The analysis provides 
examples of the kinds of problem solutions that alternative 
decision models may suggest. Those solutions may then be used 
to determine the appropriateness of the models to various 
problem settings, (c) Actual experimental data are used so 
that the problem solutions obtained may be used as actual 
recommendations. They also demonstrate a wider range of 
possible recommendations than research and extension personnel 
normally consider, (d) The problem analysis indicates the 
kinds of data which are needed for decision making under un­
certainty. It further indicates how data presently available 
may be adapted to decision making needs. 
A. Choice of Crop Varieties 
Farmers must choose crop varieties each production 
season. Some farmers do not spend much time in making this 
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choice. They plant varieties which have had satisfactory 
yields and have displayed other desirable characteristics in 
past years. The farmer or his neighbors may have had actual 
experience with the variety or varieties chosen. Other 
farmers consult with research and extension personnel and 
review experiment station and commercial literature before 
making a choice. 
Research and extension specialists spend considerable 
time and other resources in evaluating crop varieties and 
presenting variety data and recommendations to farmers. 
Usually several varieties are rated as acceptable because 
their yields, disease resistance, maturity time, test weight 
and other characteristics meet certain standards. Other char­
acteristics equal, varieties are usually recommended which 
have had the highest average yield over a period of years. 
Thus, the usual recommendations are based on the Laplace cri­
terion. The discussion in Chapters IV and V has shown that 
all farmers may not wish to follow plans suggested by that 
criterion. 
The variety problem results because one variety does 
not normally outyield all others every year. The problem may 
be stated in terms of the general problem formulation pre­
sented in Chapter IV. Farmer acts or alternatives are the 
several available varieties. Components of nature - rainfall, 
insects, disease, temperature - may occur in various combina-
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tions to form a state of nature or production condition. Any 
given year represents such a combination. Thus, each yesr 
for which variety data are available represents a state of 
nature. 
The variety analysis takes only the yield characteristic 
into consideration. This is probably the most important 
characteristic to farmers. An index could have been con­
structed attaching weight to other characteristics such as 
quality. For simplicity, this procedure was not followed. 
Only varieties are considered which are rated ss generally 
acceptable by the Iowa Experiment Station (27). Character­
istics other than yield are partially taken account of in 
that way. 
The outcome resulting from a pair of farmer-nature 
alternatives is measured in bushel yields per acre. All pos­
sible pairs of farmer and nature alternatives form a matrix 
of outcomes. In game theory terminology, the latter is a 
payoff matrix. Seed costs for various varieties are approxi­
mately equal. Thus, each of the farmer alternatives requires 
the same resource input. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
choose varieties on the basis of bushels produced per acre. 
The farmer wants to choose varieties which will provide a 
yield pattern and yield level best suited to his problem set­
ting. 
Data used in the variety problems were obtained from 
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annual progress reports on lows experiments! farms. It is 
not possible with the data available to determine whether 
yield differences between varieties in a given year are sig­
nificant . A one bushel yield difference may be shown between 
two varieties in a given year. That difference may be due 
to chance alone and not to true differences between the vari­
eties. A refinement of this study might include only vari­
eties which are significantly different in at least one year. 
In years where their yields are statistically equal, equal 
yields could be used. However, it can be argued that a dif­
ference at a low level of significance should be considered. 
A farmer may be willing to take advantage of even a 50 percent 
chance of getting a higher yield from one variety as compared 
with another, particularly if he has little chance of getting 
a lower yield. 
As indicated above, each'year of yield data is affected 
by a unique combination of weather, disease and insects. 
New varieties are continuously being developed. Thus, the 
period of years covered by the variety yield data is rela­
tively short. The newer, superior varieties have been used 
in tests only a few years. The best a farmer can do is use 
the data he has available to make a choice. Therefore, he 
has no way of taking account of possible outcomes which could 
result from other states of nature (years). He can only hone 
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that the relationship between varieties will not change in 
an unfavorable direction when a different type of year is 
experienced. 
Since one of the objectives of this study is to evaluate 
the alternative decision criteria, methodological comments 
are made throughout the following discussion. For the most 
part, such comments are made at the end of the analysis of 
each farmer problem. Methodological observations are designed 
to increase understanding of the decision criteria. They 
also give further insight into the types of problem solutions 
which the criteria suggest. Weaknesses of the criteria as 
decision making tools are easiest to point out if discussed 
in connection with the analysis of a particular farmer prob­
lem. 
1. Choice of oat varieties in northeast Iowa 
what oat variety or combination of varieties should a 
farmer plant in northeast Iowa? This section provides answers 
useful to farmers in various problem settings. Three early 
maturing, four midseason maturing and one late maturing oat 
varieties are recommended in Iowa. A farmer may choose from 
these (i-e., he has eight alternatives). Data are available 
on four of these varieties grown in Howard county (northeast 
Iowa) during the period 1953-1957. Thus, the farmer knows of 
five states of nature and has four alternative acts. Table 1 
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shows the farmer-nature payoff matrix for the northeast lows 
oat variety decision problem. Table 2 shows the Savage re­
gret matrix for the same problem. The Savage regret matrix 
was obtained by subtracting the highest yield under each year 
(column) from each other yield in that same year (column). 
All outcomes are in bushels per acre• 
Table 3 indicates the strategies (varieties) which re­
sult from application of the game theoretic decision models. 
The average model is replaced by the Laplace criterion in 
this example. The probability model can not be used because 
frequency data for different types of years are not available. 
The Wald solution, a mixed strategy, was obtained by convert­
ing the game against nature into a. linear programming problem. 
It was then solved by the simplex method. According to the 
assumptions of game theory, nature would never use its 1954, 
1955 and 1957 strategies.* Yields of every variety were 
higher in those years than for 1953 and 1956. Thus, assuming 
that nature Is trying to do its worst to the farmer, it would 
only use its 1955 and 1956 strategies. This, assumption must 
be made to use the Wald criterion. Thus, the size of the game 
matrix is reduced when the Wald criterion is considered. 
The Savage regret solution also calls for a mixed 
*This characteristic of many farmer-nature game matrices 
is discussed in a later section of this chapter. 
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Table 1. Farmer-nature payoff matrix for the Howard county 
(northeast Iowa) oat variety problem® 
Farmer States of nature (years) 
alternatives 19 53 19 54 1955 1956 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a 
Bonham 46 66 60 110 96 
Clintland 49 62 57 97 104 
Clarion 45 74 78 111 89 
Sauk 61 84 87 0b 100 
aSource of data: (20). 
^Sauk was hailed out in 1956. It might be argued that 
it is incorrect to count this as a zero yield in comparing 
this variety with others. However, Sauk is e late maturing 
variety and is thus uniquely subjected to hail hazard after 
the other varieties have already been harvested. Some 
farmers may exclude hail from consideration as a possible 
component of states of nature. They may think that hail is 
too Improbable for concern. However, they must be prepared 
to accept the consequences of hail if it occurs. 
Table 2. Savage regret matrix for Howard county (northeast 
Iowa) oat variety problem 
Farmer States of nature (years) 
alternatives 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Bonham -15 -18 -27 -1 -8 
Clintland -12 -22 -30 -14 0 
Clarion -16 -10 -9 0 -15 
Sauk 0 0 0 -111 -4 
Table 3. Strategies and possible outcomes suggested by four decision models 
applied to the Howard county (northeast Iowa) oat variety problem 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion6 
Type of 
strategy1 VarietyS 
Percent 
of land11 
Min.» 
bu./a. 
Av.b 
bu./a. 
Ma x.c M ax• regret^ 
bu./a. bu./a. 
Wald Mixed Clintland 
Sauk 
56 
44 
100 54.3 70.5 103.2 56.68 
Laplace Pure Clarion 100 45.0 79 .4 111.0 16.0 
aThe worst outcome which can. result from following a given strategy. 
^The long run average outcome expected, assuming that the states of nature 
considered include all possible states of nature and that each "state" is equally 
likely• 
CThe highest outcome possible from following the given strategy. 
dThe maximum outcome forgone as a result of choosing a less profitable 
alternative, viewed ex post. 
eThis column gives the decision models used to solve the farmer decision 
problem. 
fThis column indicates whether the farmer is to use one single course of 
action or several. 
gVariety choices resulting from application of alternative decision models. 
hThe nercent of land to be used for each alternative comprising the farmer's 
strategy. 
Table 3. (Continued) 
Decision model 
Cri terion 
Type of 
strategy 
Strategy Possible outcome 
Variety 
Percent 
of land 
Min. Av. Max. Max. regrel 
bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Savage 
regret Mixed 
Hurwicz Pure 
Otyu. - . 5 
.5*- -A ^ .66 
.66 ^ ^  ^ 1 
Clintland 
Clarion 
Sauk 
Clarion 
Bonham 
Clintland 
25 
66 
9 
100 
100 
100 
100 
48.0 
45.0 
46.0 
49.0 
75.0 97.5 
79.4 111.0 
75.6 110.0 
7-3.8 104.0 
13 .44 
16.0 
27.0 
30.0 
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strategy. This solution was obtained by use of the simplex 
method. All entries were made greater than or equal to zero 
by adding a constant. This step was necessary in order to 
use the most convenient simplex techniques. The solution is 
not affected by adding a constant, providing the same con­
stant is substracted from the final minimum regret solution. 
The Laplace solution simply indicates the variety that 
has the highest average. The Hurwicz solution was obtained 
by forming the optimism-pessimism index discussed in Chapter 
III. The resulting equations were then solved to determine 
the range of -v over which various varieties are optimum. It 
should be noted that a different variety is selected for each 
range of «A. 
Table 3 also contains four indications of the outcomes 
which may result from following various strategies. These 
tend to answer common questions a decision maker may ask 
about a course of action. For example, he may ask, "What is 
the worst and best that can happen? 11 or "What average outcome 
might be expected if I follow this course of action over a 
long period? 11 The column in Table 3 labeled minimum (Kin.) 
shows the worst that can happen. In the case of the Wald 
criterion, it is the security level derived from the game 
solution. For pure strategies, it is the worst outcome for 
a given variety. For the Savage regret criterion, it is the 
lowest weighted outcome of the given strategy in any year. 
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The maximum column (Max.) is derived in the same manner, 
except that the best outcomes ere considered. 
The column labeled average (Av.) is simply the average 
outcome for each of the four strategies. If each state of 
nature is equally likely to occur, then over a long period of 
years the farmer could expect to receive that average yield. 
If less favorable years are more likely than the better years, 
then the long run expectations would be lower. Assuming com­
plete uncertainty, neither of these possibilities can really 
be verified or rejected. However, some farmers may want to 
consider this long run average when making a decision. 
The regret column is included primarily to aid in 
demonstrating the characteristics of various solutions. 
However, a. farmer who really wants to minimize regret would 
be Interested in that column. A farmer who does not wish to 
forego an opportunity for very high yields would at least 
take note of that column. 
a. Appropriateness of the criteria. One problem set­
ting, which the discussion in Chapter V indicated should be 
considered, was one in which a farmer wishes to maximize long 
run profit. It should be recalled that he must be able and 
willing to accept short run unfavorable outcomes. The 
strategy*suggested by the Laplace criterion has the highest 
*It is the same as the strategy for the Hurwicz cri­
terion, 0 £ £ • 5. 
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average of any alternative. The strategy is to use Clarion 
oats on all acres. Although yields in some years may be 45.0 
bushels per acre, yields may be 111 bushels per acre in other 
years. The farmer using the strategy must be confident that 
the distribution of years which he faces will not result in 
some other strategy having a higher average over the long 
run. Clarion oats average about four bushels per acre above 
other varieties; thus, each year does not have to occur 
exactly the same number of times. 
The second problem setting is one in which a farmer must 
consider short run outcomes. The factors leading to such a 
problem setting were discussed in Chapter V. The setting 
essentially implies that for some reason, the farmer must 
have an outcome above a given level or must have the maximum 
sure outcome possible. It would only apply to the variety 
problem if the consequences of yields falling below a minimum 
income level are very severe. This might be the case where 
a crop provides the major source of income or where the grain 
is needed for an inflexible livestock system. 
The Wald solution suggests planting 56 percent of oat 
land to Clintland and 44 percent to Sauk.* Using this strat-
#A11' problems considered in this dissertation have 
alternative courses of action which are not mutually exclu­
sive. Thus, a mixed strategy will always call for using 
several courses of action simultaneously. For example, 
several oat varieties may be used in one year by planting 
of the land to one variety and (continued on next page) 
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egy, a yield of 54.3 bushels per acre would be assured every 
year.* That is the best strategy against the worst that 
nature can do. Nature's best strategy (worst for the farmer) 
is to use its 1953 strategy 89 percent of the time and its 
1956 strategy 11 percent of the time. The security level of 
54.3 bushels is five bushels higher than that of the next 
best strategy. A farmer following this plan would sacrifice 
in terms of average and maximum possibilities. His regret in 
some years would be 56.7 bushels. That is, he would find that 
in some years another plan would have given him an additional 
56.7 bushels per acre. 
Farmers with problem settings between the two specified 
above might find another plan more desirable. One farmer 
might be willing to accept a lower security level in order 
to get a higher possible average. The Hurwicz criterion 
with .66^=^-1 provides such a plan. As ek becomes smaller, 
the security level decreases and averages increase. Other 
farmers might follow a plan suggested by the Hurwicz criterion 
with a smaller o* . A farmer who wishes to minimize regret 
(footnote continued from previous page) perhaps ( 100-x)of 
the land to another variety. The strategy-possible outcome 
table for each problem gives the percentage of the relevant 
resource (i.e., land, T.D.N., pasture, etc.) to be used for 
each course of action comprising a strategy. 
*It is assumed that all possible years are included in 
the states of nature considered. 
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would use Clintland on 25 percent of his oat land, Clarion 
on 66 percent and Sauk on 9 percent. 
Farmers and researchers will be interested in the solu­
tions with regard to the maturity time of the varieties they 
suggest. The Wald mixed strategy calls for using Clintland, 
a midseason variety, and Sauk, a late season variety. Thus 
a conservative farmer would apparently plant varieties with 
these two maturity times. A farmer who wants a higher average 
would plant Clarion, a midseason variety. The Savage regret 
criterion says to use two midseason varieties and one late. 
The gambling strategy, Hurwicz with 0 - ^  -.5, calls for 
using Clarion also. Only the Hurwicz solution with .5£"<- .66 
says to use the early variety, Bonham. Thus, most of the cri­
teria agree that late or midseason varieties are preferable. 
2. Methodological comments 
The farmer problem represented by Table 1 has a charac­
teristic which is quite common to agricultural data. It was 
pointed out previously that, according to the assumptions of 
game theory, nature would never use Its 19 54, 1955 and 195? 
strategies. That is, it is assumed that nature is trying to 
do its worst to the farmer. Thus, it would not use strategies 
which have a higher payoff for each farmer alternative than 
another strategy. When the Wald solution is obtained, these 
years must be excluded from the payoff matrix. The Wald 
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solution is thus extremely pessimistic. Nature is not neces­
sarily trying to do its worst to the fermer. However, the 
fact remains that such pessimism may be necessary under cer­
tain problem settings. Agricultural data often show this 
characteristic because most farmer alternatives result in 
highest returns when the state of nature is most favorable. 
The regret matrix does not show the characteristic 
pointed out above. It is unlikely that the regrets for one 
year will all be less than those for another so that nature 
has an inferior strategy. One alternative often yields high­
est for one state of nature and another yields highest for a 
different state of nature. Therefore, a mixed strategy is 
obtained more often from the Savage regret criterion than 
from the Wald criterion. 
The Savage regret solution for the Howard county oat 
variety problem has a relatively high security level and 
average but the lowest maximum. It actually gives a plan 
with less yield variation than other plans. Few farmers are 
likely to select a plan because it has the least variation. 
They may prefer a plan with great variation, providing the 
variation arises from extremely high yields rather than ex­
tremely low ones. The Savage regret solution for this prob­
lem resulted from the nature of the data and the objective 
implied by the Savage regret criterion. The criterion seeks 
to minimize regret, thus the solution is affected by the fact 
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that Sauk oats outyield other varieties in all years but two. 
In one of those years, Sauk had the lowest yield, zero 
bushels. Thus, Sauk is brought in the plan, but at a low 
level. Clintland and Clarion are in the plan because they 
each had highest yields in one year and relatively low re­
grets in other years. 
3. Choice of oat varieties in 
southern Iowa and western Iowa 
It is Instructive to note the differences in oat variety 
choices which may be made in various sections of Iowa. Thus, 
oat yield data are presented for the Seymour-Shelby soil asso­
ciation area (southern Iowa) and for western Iowa. Data were 
obtained from progress reports from the Seymour-Shelby Experi­
mental Farm and the Western Iowa Experimental Farm. 
Tables 22 and 23 contain the farmer-nature payoff 
matrices for these two areas. These tables correspond to 
Table 1 of this chapter. Six oat varieties are included In 
Table 22 to demonstrate how inferior farmer alternative may 
be eliminated. A comparison of yields in Table 22 shows that 
Clintland outyielded Bonham in each of the four years covered 
by the data. Thus, Bonham is an inferior strategy. Clintland 
oats also dominate Clinton in each year. Therefore, Clinton 
is eliminated as a farmer alternative. 
Tables 24 and 25 show the regret matrices for the above 
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problems. Those tables correspond to Table 2 in the text. 
Bonham and Clinton are again inferior varieties. The regret 
for Clintland in each year is less than the regret for either 
of those two varieties. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the strategies and possible outcomes 
suggested by the game theoretic criteria for southern and 
western Iowa. Plans appropriate for different problem set­
tings can be obtained from Tables 4 and 5. The same criteria 
appropriate for problem settings discussed in the Howard 
county section are appropriate for these areas. Plans suited 
to different problem settings are summarized in Table 6, and 
discussed in the next section; thus, a discussion of Tables 
4 and 5 is not necessary here. 
a. Alternative research or extension recommendations. 
How may research and extension personnel use the results of 
the oat variety analysis? One possibility is shown in Table 
6. There, four problem settings are visualized; la and 2a 
are actually less strict statements of settings 1 and 2, 
respectively. The Laplace criterion solution is used as 
the recommendation for problem setting 1. The Hurwicz solu­
tion with the smallest range of <=< gives the plan for setting 
la. The Wald criterion yields the plan for setting 2. The 
Savage regret mixed strategy is the plan suggested for set­
ting 2a- In two areas, the Hurwicz criterion with a large 
«=* is also deemed applicable for problem setting 2a.. It 
Table 4.a Strategies and possible outcomes suggested by four decision models 
applied to the Seymour-Shelby oat variety problem 
Deci sion model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy Variety 
Percent 
of land 
Mln. 
bu./a. 
Av. 
bu./a. 
•
 CO 
CO 
.
 
Max• regret 
bu./a. 
Wald Pure Sauk 100 52 84.0 133 29 
Laplace Pure Clintland 100 44 86.2 121 13 
Savage Mixed Clintland 69 
31 
100 46.5 85.5 124 9 
Hurwicz 
0 £ 6 1 
Pure 
Sauk 100 52 
O
 
CO 133 29 
aSee the footnotes of Table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
Table 5.a Strategies and possible outcomes suggested by four decision models 
applied to western Iowa oat variety problem 
Deci sion model Strate e.v Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy Variety 
Percent 
of land 
Min. 
bu./a. 
Av. 
bu./a. 
Max. 
bu./a. 
Max. regret 
bu./a. 
Wald Pure Cherokee 100 25 57 .8 100 26 
Laplace Pure Sauk 100 14 66.0 100 11 
Savage Mixed Cherokee 
Clintland 
Clarion 
Sauk 
28 
20 
1 
51 
100 17.5 62.0 99.8 7.5 
Hurwicz 
0 <= =( 5 .7 
Pure 
Clintland 100 16 66 121 11 
• ?< o( £ l  Cherokee 100 25 57.8 100 26 
aSee the footnotes of Table 3 for an explanation of this table 
Table 6. Alternative research or extension recommendations for oat varieties 
in three areas of Iowa 
Problem setting 
Northern Iowa 
Variety Percent 
choice of land 
Southern Iowa 
Variety Percent 
choice of land 
Western Iowa 
Variety Percent 
choice of land 
1. The farmer can follow 
a. plan which may lead 
to highest long run 
profits. Clarion 100 
la.The farmer wants to 
gamble for the highest 
yield possible. He is 
in a position to accept 
the consequences of 
unfavorable outcomes. Clarion 100 
Clintland 100 
Sauk 100 
Sauk 
Sauk 
100 
100 
2. The farmer must con­
sider short run out­
comes . He must have 
assurance of a maximum 
minimum income or more 
each year. 
Clintland 
Sauk 
2a.The farmer must consider Clintland 
short run outcomes, but Clarion 
can give some weight to Sauk 
long run profit advan- or 
tages of a plan. Clintland 
56 
44 
100 
25 
66 
9 
100 
100 
Sauk 100 
Clintland 69 
Sauk 51 
o r 100 
Sauk 100 
Cherokee 
Cherokee 
Clintland 
Clarion 
Sauk 
100 
28 
20 
1 
51 
100 
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gives a higher security level hut a lower average than the 
Savage regret criterion. It is clear that all farmers would 
not wish to follow the Laplace type recommendation usually 
made-
Recommendations could be published in a form similar to 
Table 6. Discussion explaining the problem settings should 
accompany the recommendations. Alternatively, an extension 
specialist could make the appropriate recommendation after 
counseling with a farmer to determine his goals and resource 
situation. He could simply point out the alternatives and 
discuss possible outcomes. The final choice in any case is 
left to the farmer. 
The maturity times of the recommended varieties differ 
between areas. For problem setting 1, midseason varieties are 
recommended in northern and southern Iowa and a late variety 
is suggested for western Iowa. Setting la, the gambling set­
ting, calls for a midseason variety in northern Iowa and a 
late variety in the west and south. The conservative farmer, 
characterized by problem setting 2, would use a mixture of 
midseason and late in the north, late in the south, and early 
in western Iowa. For setting 2a, only farmers in western Iowa 
would include an early variety in their plans. 
A researcher might react to this distribution of maturity 
dates in various ways. For example, he might concentrate re­
search on varieties with maturity dates best suited to differ­
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ent areas. On the other hand, he may try to improve varieties 
with other maturity dates. The factors causing them to be 
less desirable might be eliminated by careful breeding and 
selection. 
4. Choice of barley varieties in western Iowa 
Farmers with opposite kinds of problem settings need not 
always have completely different plans. To demonstrate this, 
barley yields from western Iowa are considered. Two barley 
varieties, Plains and Mars, outyielded other varieties each . 
year during the period 1953 to 1957. Thus, it is assumed that 
these two varieties are the farmer's only relevant alterna­
tives. Tables 26 and 27 contain the payoff and regret matrices 
for this problem. The farmer has two alternatives and nature 
has five. 
Table 7 shows the strategies and outcomes for the game 
theoretic decision criteria. A farmer can obtain the highest 
long run average by planting Plains barley. The farmer wish­
ing the highest possible security level would also plant 
Plains. Even if a farmer wants to minimize regret, he would 
plant mostly Plains. The addition of Mars to his plan reduces 
his security level only slightly. The only farmer who would 
plant Mars exclusively is one who wants to gamble on the high­
est yield possible. 
The situation described above is significant because it 
Table 7.a Strategies and possible outcomes suggested by decision criteria apolied 
to western Iowa barley problem 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy Variety 
Percent 
of land 
Min • 
bu ./a. 
Av. 
bu./a. 
M ax. 
bu./a. 
Max. regret 
bu./a. 
Wald Pure Plains 100 21 48 62 6 
Laplace Pure Plains 100 21 48 62 6 
Sav age 
regret Mixed Plains 
Mars 
70 
30 
100 20 47 64 4.2 
Hurwicz 
0 ^  t. 54 
Pure 
Mars 100 16 43 68 14 
. 54 ± ± 1 Plains 100 21 48 62 6 
aSee the footnotes of Table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
allows a research or extension worker to make simple recom­
mendations with confidence. Assuming that the varieties are 
equal in other respects, Plains barley could be generally 
recommended for western Iowa. The researcher might also men­
tion that Mars may out-yield Plains in a few years so that 
the farmer can consider the alternative of gambling on a max­
imum yield. 
5. Choice of corn varieties 
Corn is a. major source of income to Iowa farmers ; thus, 
it is important to select corn varieties which yield in 
accordance with a farmer's requirements. His requirements 
may include consistency and high, long-term averages. This 
decision problem is suited to the analysis in this disserta­
tion. 
Data for this section were obtained from annual Iowa corn 
yield tests (17). One set of yields comes from northeast 
Iowa, Iowa Corn Test Area 3. The other comes from southern 
Iowa, Iowa Corn Test Area. 11. Varieties adapted to the two 
areas are different because of differences in growing seasons. 
Varieties were selected which had relatively high yields, in 
comparison to other varieties tested, over several years of 
testing. Differences in performances of the varieties con­
sidered are rather small, and perhaps not significant. How­
ever, even small differences may be important to some farmers. 
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a. Northeast Iowa. Table 28 contains the farmer-nature 
payoff matrix for northeast Iowa corn variety yields. Every 
variety had a lower yield in 1955 than for any other year. 
It must be assumed that nature would always use its 1955 
strategy, thus no 'wald mixed strategy can be obtained. Table 
29 shows the regret matrix for this problem. A Savage mixed 
strategy can be obtained. 
Table 8 shows strategies and outcomes suggested by four 
decision criteria. A farmer wanting a maximum long run aver­
age yield should use P-A.G- 277. His yields may be 86 bushels 
per acre in some years and 129 bushels per acre in other 
years. Over the long run his average yields should be almost 
1 bushel per acre higher than from any other single variety. 
The most this plan can cost him in terms of opportunity missed 
(regret) is 8 bushels per acre. 
A farmer who wants to be sure of the highest possible 
yield every year should plant Pioneer 371. His security level 
with that variety is 93 bushels per acre. He must accept a 
lower long run expectation. In some years his regret may be 
12 bushels per acre. 
From a practical point of view, the Savage regret cri­
terion suggests a very desirable plan. It provides a higher 
security level than the Laplace plan ; however, the average is 
only slightly lower. A farmer following this plan would, of 
course, be certain that he would never sacrifice more than 
Table 8.a Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to 
northeast Iowa corn variety problem 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy Variety 
Percent 
of land 
Mln. 
bu./a. 
Av . 
bu./a. 
Max • 
bu./a. 
Max. regret 
bu./a. 
Wald Pure Pioneer 371 100 93 111.4 122 12 
Laplace Pure P.A.G. 277 100 86 112.? 129 8 
Savage 
regret Mixed Pioneer 
Pioneer 
Pioneer 
P . A . G. 
347 
371 
352 
277 
8 
26 
21 
45 
100 88 111.7 124.1 4.8 
Hurwicz 
0 ^ ~ • 5 
Pure 
P . A. G. 277 100 86 112.2 129 8 
1 Pioneer 371 100 93 111.4 122 12 
aSee the footnotes of Table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
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4.8 bushels because of choosing the wrong plan. 
b. Southern Iowa. Table 30 shows the farmer-nature pay­
off matrix for southern Iowa variety yields. In this case, 
only 1952, 1953, 1955 and 19 5? are inferior strategies for 
nature. However, the Wald solution calls for a pure strategy 
because Pioneer 301b has its minimum yield in 1955 end that 
yield is also the maximum yield of any variety for that year. 
That is, the minimum in a row is also the maximum in a column. 
Table 31 contains the regret matrix for this problem. A 
mixed strategy can be obtained from this matrix. 
A brief glance at Table 9 shows that Pioneer 301b will 
fulfill farmer requirements in both of the problem settings 
considered in this chapter. It not only has the highest secu­
rity level but also the highest average. The farmer who wants 
to gamble on the highest possible yield would use P.A.C-. 170. 
The Savage solution requires only a small sacrifice in secu­
rity level and average in order to follow a plan which pro­
vides the least possible regret. 
B. Choice of Fertilizer Combinations and Amounts 
Two fertilizer problems are considered in this section. 
The first requires choice of nutrient combinations and levels 
of fertilizer for producing corn. The second is a composite 
problem requiring choice of varieties, stand level and amount 
of nitrogen fertilizer for producing corn. The analysis for 
Table 9.a Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to 
southern Iowa corn variety problem 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Cri terion 
Type of 
strategy Variety 
Percent 
of land 
Min. 
bu./a. 
Av. 
bu./a. 
Max. 
bu./a. 
Max. regret 
bu./a. 
Wald Pure Pioneer 301b 100 78 98.7 118 8 
Laplace Pure Pioneer 301b 100 78 98.7 118 8 
Savage 
regret i'ii.xed Pioneer 301b 
P.A.G. 170 
M ay go Id 47 
Iowa 4565 
43 
34 
5 
18 
100 76.1 97.1 117.8 5.6 
Hurwic z 
OS 5 
Pure 
P.A.G. 170 100 75 97.2 1?1 10 
•5 6 6 1 Pioneer 301b 100 78 98.7 118 8 
aSee the footnotes of Table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
both of these problems demonstrates that data available from 
present experiments may be adapted for use of various decision 
models. 
1. Choice of manure, phosphorus 
and potassium levels 
Should a farmer fertilize corn? If he should fertilize, 
which nutrients should he apply? How much of the various 
nutrients should be applied? These are the questions facing 
a farmer in the following decision problem. The locales of 
the problem are northeast and north eastcentral Iowa. 
a. Northeast Iowa. Data for solving this problem were 
obtained from experimental results at the Howard County Ex­
perimental Farm and the Carrington-Clyde Experimental Farm. 
The Howard County data are considered first. The date are 
from manure-phosphorus-potassium experiments conducted from 
1952 to 1957. The experiment actually included a three year 
corn-oats-meadow rotation. Only the corn data are considered 
in this problem. The aggregate yields of all crops in the 
rotation could have been considered. Because only corn is 
studied, the carry-over effects of fertilizer on other crops 
are not credited to returns from fertilizer. 
The experiment provides data which might be considered 
as eight farmer alternatives. These include no fertilizer 
(Ck.); manure only (M); phosphorus only (P); potassium only 
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(K); phosphorus and potassium (PK); manure and phosphorus 
(MP); manure and potassium (MK) and manure, phosphorus and 
potassium (MPK) . Manure was applied at the rate of 6 tons 
per acre, ahead of corn in the rotation. Phosphorus and 
potassium were both applied at the rate of 30 pounds per acre. 
It is assumed that these are all the alternatives about 
which the farmer has knowledge. Actually, he might include 
other levels or combinations of fertilizer as alternatives. 
Table 32 shows the farmer-nature fertilizer game when manure 
is free. The farmer has eight alternative strategies and 
nature has six strategies. Each year is regarded as a state 
of nature. Table -33 shows the regret matrix for this prob­
lem. 
Payoffs are returns above fertilizer costs and cost of 
application.^ A constant, equal to the value of production 
in the lowest year for corn not fertilized, is subtracted 
from each payoff in order to reduce the size of the payoffs. 
Table 32 is the payoff matrix for a situation in which a 
farmer has manure available and need only charge for apply­
ing it. It is assumed that he has no alternative use for the 
manure or that it is most profitably used on corn. Table 34 
shows the payoff matrix for this fertilizer problem when 
manure is not free. A ton of manure is roughly equivalent 
*A detailed description of the manner in which payoffs 
were computed is contained in a footnote of Table 32. 
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to 100 pounds of 10-5-10 fertiliser- Thus, rather than apply 
manure the farmer can use 600 pounds of 10-5-10. The cost of 
fertilizer to replace manure is subtracted from payoffs in 
Table 34. The Savage regret matrix for this problem is con­
tained in Table 35. 
The strategies and outcomes suggested by the four game 
theoretic decision criteria are shown in Tables 10 and 11. 
A farmer whose planning horizon and resource situation allow 
him to plan over the long run will use manure and nhosnhorus 
on corn. This is the plan given by the Laplace solution. 
Even though he must buy fertilizer to substitute for manure, 
he will follow the same plan. This plan also indicates the 
amount of fertilizer which is apparently most profitable over 
the long run. The level is roughly 60 pounds of nitrogen, 
60 pounds of phosphorus and 60 pounds of potassium. It is 
assumed that all possible kinds of years are represented in 
the data available• Thus, caution should be taken in making 
such a recommendation. The need for data from long term 
experiments is made clear in this example-
The farmer who must be sure of the highest possible level 
of returns each year will use only manure, providing it is 
free. If he must buy substitutes for manure, he will use 
phosphorus and potassium on 77 percent of his land and manure 
and phosphorus on 23 percent. These plans differ from the 
long run profit maximizing plan in both level and kind of 
Table 10.a Strategies and outcomes suggested by four decision criteria annlied 
to Howard county fertilizer problem (no charge for manure) 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Cri terion 
Type of 
strategy 
Alter­
native 
Percent 
of land 
Min. 
%/e. 
Av . 
8/e. 
Max. 
^/a. 
Max. regret 
A/a. 
Wald Pure M 100 14. 80 37.93 53.74 11.76 
Laplace Pure MP 100 10.98 38.46 64.84 5.43 
Savage 
regret Mixed M 
MP 
MK 
31 
65 
4 
100 12.11 38.00 49.40 4.07 
Hurwicz 
0 -6. *=< t_. 74 
Pure 
MP 100 10.98 38.46 64.84 5.43 
. 74 * 1 M 100 14 .80 37.93 53.74 11.76 
aSee the footnotes of Table 3 for an explanation of this table-
Table 11. Strategies and outcomes suggested by four decision criteria applied to 
Howard county fertilizer problem (charge for manure equivalent) 
Decision model Strategy Possible ; outcome 
Cri terion 
Type of 
strategy 
Alter­
native 
Percent 
of land 
Min. 
•S/a • 
Av . 
S/a -
Max. M 
4'/a. 
ax. regret 
%/a. 
Wald Mixed PK 
MP 
77 
23 
100 6.77 25.04 37.77 13.87 
Laplace Pure MP 100 -2.22 25.26 51.64 11.62 
Sav age 
regret Mixed PK 
MP 
39 
61 
100 1.54 25.15 44.61 7.06 
Hurwio z 
0m£.68 
Pure 
MP 100 -P.22 25.26 51.64 11.62 
. 68 < «< £l 1 PK 100 5.70 24.98 35.34 18.01 
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fertilizer used. The manure plan includes only 60-30-60 and 
the PK plan only 0-30-30 as compared to the 60-60-60 plan for 
the other problem setting. The reason for the plan differ­
ences may be seen by reference to Table 34. Additional nitro­
gen and phosphorus do not result in higher profit in some 
years. Where manure is not free, the farmer may raise his 
security level #9.00 by using less fertilizer. He sacrifices 
very little in possible long run average. Thus, even a farmer 
who can plan to maximize long run profits might prefer the 
Wala mixed strategy. 
The Savage regret strategy provides a plan which combines 
characteristics of both the Wald and Laplace plans. Its 
security level, particularly when manure is free, is not much 
less than that of the Wald solution. The average for the 
Savage regret plan is within a few cents of that of the 
Laplace. In addition, the Savage plan will more nearly be 
the most profitable one in many years because the maximum re­
gret is considerably lower than the possible regret for other 
plans. The Hurwicz solution for this problem is very similar 
or identical to those of other criteria. 
b. North eastcentral Iowa. Tables 36 and 38 contain the 
farmer-nature payoff matrices for corn production in the 
Garrington-C1yde soil area. Tables 37 and 39 contain the 
regret matrices for this problem. Tables 12 and 13 show 
strategies and possible outcomes for farmers who have manure 
Table 12• Strategies and outcomes suggested by four decision criteria applied to 
Carrington-Clyde fertilizer problem (no charge for manure) 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy 
Alter-
nativ e 
Percent 
of land 
Min . Av . 
Vs. 
Max. Mpx 
'
!%/n . 
. rep-ret 
s/..' 
Wald Pure MP 100 23.80 49.94 72.44 4.58 
Laplace Pure MP 100 23.80 49.24 72.44 4.5B 
Savage 
regret Mixed M 
MP 
32 
68 
100 21.80 48.84 69.63 3.10 
Hurwicz 
0 1 
Pure 
MP 100 23.80 49.24 72.44 4.58 
Table 13. Strategies and outcomes suggested by four decision criteria applied 
to Carrington-Clyde fertilizer problem ( charge for manure equivalent) 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy 
Alter­
native 
Percent 
of land 
Min. 
•:/n . 
Av . 
5/ a . 
Max. M p. x . regret 
#/p. 3/a. 
Wald Pure PK 100 12.84 33.62 61.99 16.60 
Laplace Pure MP 100 10.60 36.05 59.?4 5.46 
Savage 
regret Mixed M 
PK 
MP 
32 
18 
50 
100 9.00 35.21 57.42 3.86 
Hurwicz 
o e i 
Pure 
MP 100 12.84 33.62 61.28 16.60 
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and for those v.'ho must buy a manure substitute. 
If a fermer wants to maximize long run profit he might 
always apply MP. When manure is free, MP also provides the 
highest security level. However, if the farmer must buy a 
manure substitute, PK provides the highest security level. 
In that case, 8 farmer would use no nitrogen and P5O5 and 
KgO applications would be cut in half. He can raise his 
security level S2.24 by using a lower level of fertilizer. 
Evidently, very little additional returns are obtained from 
nitrogen and heavy amounts of P0O5 and K9O in some years. 
This may be verified by reference to Table -38. 
In order to minimize regret when manure is free, a farmer 
must accept a lower security level and average return. If 
manure substitutes must be purchased, the Savage regret solu­
tion results in s lower security level than all other plans. 
However, it has a higher average than the Wald plan. It seems 
unlikely that a farmer would follow such a plan unless he 
does wish to minimize regret. 
An extension or research specialist who advises farmers 
on fertilizer application could make extensive use of the 
analytical techniques discussed in this section. In doing 
so, he could be sure his recommendations are consistent with 
the problem setting and goals of different farmers. Consider­
able data of the nature used in the fertilizer example are 
available at experiment stations. Thus, opportunities exist 
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for extensive work on decision making under uncertainty. 
C. Choice of Variety, Fertilizer Level 
and Stand Level 
Each crop enterprise requires a number of individual de­
cisions. For example, a farmer must choose varieties, ferti­
lizers and cultural practices. There are a number of possible 
choices within each decision category. The outcome of each 
is often affected by the same states of nature. The outcome 
of each possible choice is also affected by decisions on other 
aspects of the crop enterprise. All combinations of one vari­
ety alternative, one fertilizer alternative and one cultural 
practice alternative form a set of farmer courses of action. 
The possible states of nature form nature's strategies. Thus, 
a problem is formed which is appropriate for game theoretic 
analysis. A farmer problem of this type is considered in 
this section. 
Data for this problem were obtained from a planting rate 
and nitrogen experiment conducted at the Seymour-Shelby Ex­
perimental Farm in southern Iowa. Two varieties, four stand 
levels and three nitrogen levels were included in the experi­
ment . Only replication averages are used in the analysis. 
The following regression equation was fitted to the data for 
each variety: 
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Y = a r b]_X]_ + bgxf + b^xg + b4x§ + b^x^x? + b^x^x^x^ (l) 
where Y = predicted yield; 
X]_ = nitrogen level; 
xg = stand level; end 
X5 = a rainfall variable. 
Table 40 contains the experimental date and the regression 
equation fitted. That table also explains each of the vari­
ables included in equation 1. The equation was fitted in 
order that levels of the variable could be selected, rather 
than be limited to the levels involved in the experiment. 
Table 41 shows a payoff matrix constructed, by use of 
equation 1. Nitrogen levels of 0, 10, 90, 40 and 60 pounds 
per acre were used. Stand levels of 12,000; 16,000; and 
20,000 were included. Rainfall amounts used were 6, 8, 10, 
and 12 inches. The two alternative varieties, an early one 
and an adapted one, are also included. Only farmer alter­
natives which are not inferior to another alternative at all 
rainfall levels are included in Table 41. It will be noted 
that nature has only one non-inferior strategy. Thus, the 
waid solution must be a pure strategy. Table 42 shows the 
Savage regret matrix for this problem. Only non-inferior 
nature strategies are included. The five years during which 
the experiment was conducted were not favorable ones for 
using high nitrogen and stand levels. Thus, the results shown 
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discourage use of high levels of fertilizer and stand. 'The 
rainfall variable used only partially relates yields to 
weather conditions. Rainfall timeliness, temperatures end 
maturing conditions are also important. These were generally 
unfavorable during 195-3 to 195?. Results for the experiment 
in 1956 show a much higher yield increase from nitrogen and 
s tend « 
The regression equation allows use of two other decision 
models discussed in Chapter V. These are the average and the 
probability (risk) approaches. An average weather condition 
can be estimated and substituted in equation 1. Then, mar­
ginal analysis may be used to determine the most profitable 
long run alternatives. Probabilities of various levels of 
rainfall for use in the probability (risk) model may be esti­
mated by use of past weather records. These probabilities 
may then be used to estimate the long run average outcome for 
each alternative. The one with the highest average is the 
alternative selected. 
Only the probability approach is used here. Use of an 
average would give similar results to that of Laplace cri­
terion . The marginal analysis involved has been presented 
in much agricultural research arid is well known (14). It 
might offer the advantage of choosing a unique level of 
stand and nitrogen which is most profitable. The levels 
Ill 
picked In this analysis are somewhat arbitrary. The problem 
of selecting levels is similar to the one of picking activ­
ities for linear programming analysis. 
Weather records for the period 1925 to 19 57 -were exam­
ined to determine the frequency with which various rainfall 
levels occur. The following frequencies for the rainfall 
variable used in this analysis were found: rainfall <7 
inches, .06; 7 inches £ rainfall ^ 9 inches, .1; 9 inches i-
rainfall -11 inches, .13; and rainfall ill inches, .71. 
These frequencies were applied to the data in Table 41 to 
determine the plan with the highest long run expectation. 
Table 14 shows the plan suggested by the probability model 
as well as those suggested by other decision criteria. It 
also shows possible results of using the alternative plans. 
The first problem setting considered is again that in 
which a farmer can plan to obtain highest returns over a 
long period of time. Two plans in Table 14 are suited to 
this setting. If the farmer is willing to assume that past 
rainfall records provide a good estimate of the probability 
that various amounts of rainfall will occur, he may use the 
probability model. His average expectations over a period 
of years would be 849.63. In some years he can get only 
$1.6? and in other years #56.34 above the cost of fertilizer, 
seed, transportation and storage. His plan would be to use 
the adapted variety, 20 pounds of fertilizer and a IP,000 plant 
Table 14. Strategies and outcomes suggested by five decision models applied to 
Seymour-Shelby nitrogen-stand-varlety problem 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy Alternative 
Percent 
of land 
Min. 
8/a • 
Av . 
G/p. 
Max. 
v/p -
Max. regret 
$/« • ' 
Probabili ty Pure Adapted variety; 
5=12,000; N=20# 100 1.67 49.63 56.54 7.58 
Wa.ld Pure Early variety ; 
5=12,000;- N=0 100 9.25 37.05 59.29 4.71 
Laplace Pure Early variety; 
5=12,000; N=0 100 9.75 37.05 5C.2A 4.71 
Savage Mixed Early variety; 
8=12,000; N=0 
Adapted variety; 
8=19,000; N=0 
53 
47 
100 6.34 36.15 54.03 9.94 
Hurwicz 
0 5: <3 "=- • 09 
Pure 
Adapted variety; 
5=20,000; N=60 100 -4.94 32.13 56.99 13.49 
,09 ± 4 ^ .11 Adapted variety ; 
5=12,000; N=40 100 .31 33.90 55.58 8.94 
. 11 < 4 < .2 Adapted variety ; 
5=12,000; N=20 100 1.67 34.63 56.34 7.58 
.2 £ c* . 38 Adapted variety; 
5=12,000; N=0 100 3.05 35.14 56.00 6.20 
.38 != ^ - 1 Adapted variety; 
5=12,000; M=0 100 9.25 27.05 5^.9B 4.71 
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per acre stand level. 
The Laplace plan given in Table 14 is also appropriate 
for the above problem setting. The plan given by the Laplace 
criterion is the early variety with no fertilizer and a 
12,000 plant per acre stand level. A farmer using this plan 
would not feel he knows enough about the distribution of 
weather to use the probability approach. The average of the 
Laplace plan is thus not strictly comparable with that of 
the probability plan. 
The farmer who must insure himself the highest possible 
level of income each year would follow a plan identical to 
that of the Laplace. A farmer with an optimism-pessimism 
index greater than .38 would also follow this plan. Only a 
farmer willing to gamble or who wishes to minimize regret 
would use another plan. These plans are the Hurwicz solu­
tions with O-^i^ .38 and the Savage regret solution. 
1. Methodological comments 
The analysis presented above indicates many possibilities 
for using experimental data for decision making under uncer­
tainty. Because of the low rainfalls experienced during the 
years this experiment was run, fertilizer does not appear 
to be very profitable. The rainfall amounts included in the 
rainfall variable used average more than 12 Inches in this 
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section of Iowa- The limits of 6 inches end 12 inches had to 
be placed on this problem to avoid extrapolating outside the 
range of the data available. Therefore, it seems advisable 
to regard this analysis primarily as an example. Real deci­
sion making guides may be derived from this experiment after 
it has run long enough to include a wider range of weather 
conditions. At that time, the rainfall variable might be re­
fined to reflect other importent weather characteristics. 
D. Choice of Crop Enterprises 
This section demonstrates the application of game the­
oretic criteria to the problem of choosing between alterna­
tive crop enterprises. The most common techniques for solving 
this problem are budgeting and linear programming. The usual 
procedure is to compute the average return per acre or per 
bushel for a particular crop. This return is usually the 
value of production above variable costs. It is an average 
return because average yields, average prices and average 
input coefficients are usually used. The problem is to 
choose a crop or combination of crops which allow the greatest 
return to given amounts of fixed resources. Both budgeting 
and linear programming lead to choice of a crop or combina­
tion of crops which give the highest average expected return 
for a "bundle11 of fixed resources. It can be seen that these 
techniques are closely related to the Laplace criterion. The 
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plans they suggest are appropriate for s farmer who can stay 
in business long enough to realize the expected return. 
Another criterion for choice of crop enterprises was 
referred to in Chapter II. There it was suggested that s 
farmer might choose an enterprise which gives the highest-
sure return every year. Enterprises with high variability, 
including variation below minimum return levels of other 
alternatives, are avoided under this criterion. This choice 
criterion is very much like the VJald criterion. If emphasis 
on the security level is allowed to vary, it is also similar 
to the Hurwicz criterion. These criteria are appropriate for 
reasons which have been discussed in this dissertation. 
The preceding paragraphs indicate that game theoretic 
techniques are useful for choosing between crop enterprises. 
The sample problem used is choice between oat and barley 
enterprises in western Iowa. The problem matrices for this 
example are contained in Tables 43 and 44. Only five years 
of data are considered so that currently recommended vari­
eties can be used. An alternative is to use a. long series 
of oat and barley yields without regard to variety to insure 
the inclusion of more possible outcomes than are shown in 
five years of data. The example given here should be used 
cautiously as a basis for recommendations because it in­
cludes so few of the many possible returns from oats and 
barley. 
US 
Table 15 shows the strategies end outcomes suggested by-
various decision criteria. Barley was selected by both the 
Wald and Laplace criteria. Thus, barley is apparently the 
"safest" crop and the most profitable over the long run. If 
a farmer wants to ramble on higher returns, he may grow Sauk 
oats or a combination of Sauk oats end Plains barley. Choice 
on the basis of profitability assumes that the crops cost the 
same to produce and offer no particular advantage in other 
ways, such as use for a nurse crop for legumes. 
The prices used for a problem such as this affect the 
outcome of the analysis. Prices could be included in the 
problem. Possible oat-barley price situations could be ob­
tained by examining series of past prices. Then all combina­
tions of possible price and yield situations could be re­
garded as states of nature. 
Table 15. Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to a 
crop enterprise selection problem 
Decision model 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy 
Strategy Possible outcome 
Crop 
Percent 
of land 
Min, 
&/a 
Av. Max• Max. regret 
$/a. Va. 
Wald 
Laplace 
Savage 
regret 
Hurwicz 
O ^ - .68 
• 68 ^  ^ t 1 
Pure 
Pure 
Mixed 
Pure 
Plains barley 100 
Plains barley 100 
Sauk oats 47 
Plains barley 55 
100 
Sauk oats 100 
Plains barley 100 
17 
17 
13 
8 
17 
39.4 
59.4 
36.8 
33 
38.4 
50 
50 
57 
64 
50 
14 
14 
8.5 
16 
15 
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VII. PLANKING PASTURE AND LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
UNDER IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE 
The analysis in this chapter is similar to that of Chap­
ter VI. Three pasture and livestock problems are considered. 
First, methods of choosing pasture mixtures under uncertain 
weather conditions are presented. Second, the complex prob­
lem of planning pasture stocking rates is considered. Fin­
ally, an example is given of the way alternative choice cri­
teria may be used to choose between competitive livestock 
enterprises. In addition, suggestions are made for solving 
other livestock problems which are applicable to the analysis 
presented in this dissertation. 
Like the preceding one, this chapter demonstrates the 
application of decision models to real farmer problems. It 
also allows further analysis of the appropriateness of the 
decision models for farmer uncertainty problems. The results 
may be used as actual recommendations for farmers in a few 
Iowa areas. 
A. Choice of Pasture Mixtures 
Considerable research has been conducted on pasture mix­
tures for Iowa. Many of the new grass and legume species out-
yield older ones. Research and extension educational efforts 
have interested many farmers in seeding the new mixtures. 
However, an analysis of data available on the newer mixtures 
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indicates that one mixture is not clearly superior to another 
in every year. Assuming that the mixtures cost about the 
same end are equal in other respects, which mixture should a 
former plant? This is a problem well suited to analysis in 
this dissertation. 
What does a farmer want from his pasture? Some farmer's 
livestock programs are flexible enough that livestock numbers 
can be adjusted to the available pasture. Farmers in that 
position want to seed a pasture which has the highest average 
yield over a period of yenrs. This assumes that profits 
from grazing livestock on pasture are highly positively cor­
related with pasture production. A farmer in this situation 
could presumably adjust livestock numbers down in bad years 
and up in good years. After a period of years, he will have 
obtained a higher total value of beef than if he had pasture 
with a less variable and lower average yield. 
Other farmers have an inflexible livestock system. For 
example, a beef cow herd, a dairy herd or a rigid deferred 
feeding beef program require a. fairly constant number of 
animals each year. It may be quite uneconomical to vary 
numbers in such enterprises because of their interrelation­
ship with the whole farm operation, and not just to pasture. 
Some minimum amount of pasture is required during some period 
of each year. At these times pasture is a vital link in the 
whole year plan. In this situation, a farmer would probably 
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prefer to choose s pasture mixture which always provides the 
amount of pasture needed at the critical period. 
The two preceding paragraphs describe two problem set­
tings for the pasture seeding problem. Other problem settings 
may be specified which are intermediate to these. For example 
one farmer may have a livestock enterprise which is inflexible 
and requires a minimum level of pasture each year. However, 
he may have flexibility in another pert of his livestock 
plans. His pasture requirements would include a minimum 
level, but he would also give weight to having a high average, 
A mixed strategy may be appropriate which would involve plant­
ing several mixtures on different plots of land. Plans which 
are consistent with various problem settings are specified 
in the following analysis. 
1. Choice of pasture mixtures 
in northeast Iowa 
The pasture mixtures considered for Howard county are: 
alf alf a-broinegrass, Ladi no -Kentucky bluegrass, Ladino-orchard-
grass and alfalfa-timothy. It is assumed that the mixture 
of grass and legume will remain in such a proportion over the 
years that the proper balance is maintained to prevent bloat. 
Data for these mixtures over the years 1954-195? are presented 
in Table 45. There, the data are presented in the form of a 
payoff matrix. Entries are in tons of dry matter per acre -
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Table 46 contains the regret matrix for the same data. 
The plans and possible outcomes suggested by alternative 
decision criteria are presented in Table 16. A farmer with 
a flexible livestock system may want to follow the Laplace 
solution given in Table 15. This calls for using an alfalfa-
brome gras s mixture. Over a. period of years, this plan may re­
sult in an average production of 2.5 tons of dry matter per 
acre. In some years the production may be only 1.7' tons per 
acre, but livestock numbers can be adjusted to fit the pro­
duction in this problem setting. The Hurwicz solution for 
0 ± <3. 1 .71 also calls for using alf alf a-bromegrass . The size 
of the indicates that this plan is not really a "risky" 
one. However, some farmers may not be able or willing to 
take the small gamble required. 
A farmer with an inflexible livestock system may wish 
to follow the Wald plan given in Table 16. Assume that the 
profitability of his livestock system depends on the size of 
the enterprise and that this size is limited by the amount of 
pasture he can depend on each summer. He wants a pasture mix­
ture that assures him the highest possible sure level of 
pasture every year. By following the Wald criterion he can 
be sure of 1.9 tons of dry pasture matter per year. This 
would allow him to expand his livestock program to a higher 
level than is possible with another pasture mixture. Alfalfa-
timothy is the pasture mixture suggested. The Hurwicz crl-
Table 16. Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision models applied to the 
Howard county pasture problem 
Decision model Strate ev Possible outcome 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy 
Pasture 
mixture 
Percent 
of land 
Kin. 
tons/a. 
Av . 
tons/a. 
Max. 
tons/a. 
Max. regret 
tons/a. 
Wald Pure Alfalf a-
t i mo thy 100 1.9 ? .4 3.1 1.5 
Laplace Pure Alfalfa-
bromegrass 100 1.7 2 . 5 3.6 1.4 
Savage Mixed Alfa Ifa-
bromegrsss 
Ladino-
Kentucky 
bluegrass 
5-3 
47 
100 1.6 2.-3 3.0 . 75 
Hurwicz 
0 < <3 fr . 71 
Pure 
Alfalfa-
bromegrass 100 1.7 2.5 3.6 1.4 
. 71 6 =% 6 1 Alfalfa-
timothy 100 1.9 9 .4 3.1 1.5 
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terion with .71 6^ 4 t 1 gives the same plan as the VJald cri­
terion . The Savage plan is particularly inappropriate for 
this problem setting. An examination of Table 46 shows that 
the year when regret is a maximum for this plan is a year of 
low yields. Tnis may very well be a year in which the cost 
of having a non-optimum plan is highest. Feed costs might 
be particularly high that year. However, if a farmer really 
wishes to minimize regret he may plant 55 percent of his land 
to alfall"a-bromegrass and 47 percent to Ladino-Kentucky blue-
grass . 
2. Choice of pasture mixtures 
in southwest Iowa 
Data from the Soil Conservation Farm in Page county, 
southwest Iowa are used for this problem. Considerable pas­
ture research has been performed in that area. Two sets of 
pasture data are used. One includes alfalfa and grass mix­
tures . The other is made up of other legume-grass mixtures. 
The alfalfa mixtures outyielded other mixtures in every year. 
However, alfalfa may not be adapted to all land in that re­
gion. In addition, some farmers may exclude alfalfa from 
consideration because of fear of bloat. Thus, other less 
productive mixtures are also considered. 
Three alfalfa mixtures are included and are identified 
as farmer alternatives in Table 47. The years covered by 
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the data are 1952-1956. Each year Is treated as a state of 
nature. Table 48 shows the regret matrix for this problem. 
Table 17 indien tes plans and outcomes for the game theoretic 
cri teria. 
The Laplace plan is to seed all pasture acres to alfalfa-
orcharagrass• Tnis plan may give the highest average pasture 
production over a period of yesrs. Thus, it is appropriate 
for a farmer with a flexible livestock system. It is also 
appropriate for a farmer who must have the highest possible 
security level every year. The security level (lowest pos­
sible yield) is equal to that for the Uald criterion. 
A research worker making recommendations for pasture 
mixtures in southwest Iowa can be quite confident that his 
recommendations are acceptable to a wide range of possible 
problem settings. He can simply recommend alfalfa-orchard-
grass mixtures. It is again assumed that the years covered 
by the data are representative of all possible years. 
3. Methodological comment 
The Wald solution shown in Table 17 for the alfalfa mix­
tures resulted from a technicality of the game theoretic pro­
cedure. Reference to Table 47 shows that weather would the­
oretically never use its 1953, 1954 and 1955 strategies. 
When these columns are eliminated from the payoff matrix, it 
is seen that alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass outyields alfalfa-
Table 1?. Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to 
Soil Conservation Farm pasture problem (alfalfa mixture) 
Deeision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Type of Pasture Percent Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
Criterion strategy mixture of land tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
Wald Mi xed 
Laolace Pure 
Kentucky 
bluegrass-
alfalfa 60 
Smooth 
bromegrass-
alfalfa 40 
100 
Orchardgras s-
alfalfa 100 
P.5 
.5 
3. f! 
•3.7 
4 .4 
4 .6 
,96 
,1 
Savage 
regret Mixed Kentucky 
bluegrass-
alfalfa P5 
Orchardgrass-
alfalfa 75 
100 P.5 3.6 4 . 5 • 07 
Hurwicz 
o < = 4  t i  
Pure 
Orchardgrass-
alfalfa 100 9.5 3.7 4.6 
126 
orchardgrass in the remaining payoff matrix. Thus, only 
alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass and alfalfa-bromegrass remain as 
farmer alternatives. The result is a Wald solution which may 
be either pure or mixed for the same security level. That 
is, a security level of ?.. 5 tons per acre may be obtained by 
using all alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass or a combination includ­
ing 60 percent alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass and 40 percent 
alfalfa-smooth bromegrass. The mixed strategy is shown in 
Table 17. This particular circumstance indicates the impor­
tance of analyzing data rather than following purely mechan­
ical steps alone. 
4. Choice of non-alfalfa, pasture 
mixtures in southwest Iowa 
The plans suggested for using other pasture mixtures are 
presented in Table 18. The payoff matrix and the regret 
matrix are found in Tables 49 and 50, respectively. Both the 
maximum security level and the highest average are obtained 
by use of a trefoil-Kentucky bluegrass mixture. Thus, a re­
search worker may recommend this mixture with confidence, 
assuming it has other desirable characteristics. 0rchard-
grass-Ladino might be used by a farmer who is willing to 
gamble on the highest yield possible. In this case, the 
Hurwicz criterion, which suggests the orchardgrass-Ladino 
mixture, allows the same security level as the Wald criterion. 
Table 18. Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to 
Soil Conservation Farm pasture problem (non-alfalfa mixtures) 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcor ne 
Criterion 
Type of 
strategy 
Pasture Percent 
mixture of land 
Mi n . 
tons/a. 
Av. Ma x. 
tons/a. tons/a. 
Max. regret 
tons/a. 
'Wald Pure Kentucky 
bluegrass-
trefoil 100 1.0 1.5 P.3 .9 
Laplace Pure Kentucky 
bluegrass-
trefoil 100 1.0 1.5 P.3 .9 
Savage 
regret Mixed Kentucky 
bluegra.ss-
trefoil 
Orchardgrass-
trefoil 
Orchardgrsss-
Ladino 
16 
40 
44 
100 .78 1.3 1.9 .51 
Hurwicz 
0 6  4  6- 1  
Pure 
Orchardgrass-
trefoil 100 1.0 1.4 P.4 .9 
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The Savage regret mixed strategy allows the lowest regret 
possible but has other disadvantages. 
B. Choice of Pasture Stocking Rates 
A very complex problem which farmers must face is decid­
ing how many animals to have for a given pasture acreage. 
The decision must normally be made before the farmer knows 
how much forage will be produced. Once the decision on num­
bers is made, it often must hold for a number of seasons. 
For example, a farmer with a dairy herd or a beef cow-calf 
enterprise cannot vary cattle numbers very much once the herd 
is built up. Losses often result because of between year 
variation in pasture yields. 
Heady e_t al. ( 1-3, pp. 204-206) conducted a survey in Iowa 
to determine what adjustments farmers make in their plans for 
year to year pasture variation. Ninety one percent of the 
farmers said they either: (a) plan stocking rates on the 
basis of average pasture production over a period of years; 
(b) plan stocking rates for poorer years; or (c) plan for the 
better years and feed hay or rent additional pasture to make 
up deficits in bad years. The other 9 percent adjust live­
stock numbers to pasture conditions or feed grain. The latter 
measures are mostly actions of farmers who primarily graze 
stocker or feeder cattle on pasture-
The five alternative courses of action mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph may be considered as possible farmer 
strategies in a game against nature. Actually, only the three 
most prevalent ones are considered in the following problems. 
Nature's alternatives are different kinds of years. These 
may be represented by various levels of pasture production 
measured in animal units which one acre will support in that 
year. Five pasture yield levels are considered here. 
The cattle system considered is a beef cow-calf enter­
prise. Cows are bred to calve early in the spring. Calves 
are sold in October as good to choice feeder calves weighing 
400 pounds. A cow and calf require about 20 pounds of total 
digestible nutrients (T.D.N.) per day (32). Per acre annual 
yields are converted to T.D.N, by multiplying them by their 
T.D.N, percentage (32). Acre requirements of a cow and calf 
are determined by dividing pounds of T.D.N, produced per year 
by 20 times the number of days grazing is required. It is 
implicitly assumed that within year variation of pasture 
yields can be handled by rotation grazing and various other 
cattle management schemes. 
Two sets of pasture data are used for the analysis. Both 
are from experiments at the Grundy-Shelby Experimental Farm 
in Ringgold county, Iowa during 1951-1957. Table 51 shows the 
farmer-nature payoff matrix for unimproved Kentucky bluegrass 
pasture. Table 52 contains the regret matrix for this urob-
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lem. Tables 53 and 54 show the payoff and regret matrices 
for Kentucky bluegrass pasture which has had an application 
of superphosphate and is over seeded with lespedeza. 
In addition to pasture yield uncertainty, the farmer is 
confronted with price uncertainty. He does not know what 
the price of calves will be and he does not know what the 
price of feed will be if he is forced to supplement the pas­
ture . Price uncertainty is also accounted for in the problem 
matrices. Three possible price situations are hypothesized. 
One is that prices will be like 1953 prices, when hay was 
relatively expensive in comparison to feeder calf prices. 
The second is that prices will be like those in 1956 when 
hay was chaper compared to feeder prices then in 1953. In 
the third price situation the hay and feeder calf prices used 
are the average of 1948-1957. Many other price situations 
could have been considered. However, at the price levels 
considered, only drastic changes in relative prices would 
change the plans selected. Such changes would cause shifts 
in the relative amounts of each alternative entering a mixed 
strategy plan. All combinations of prices and pasture levels 
make up the possible states of nature. 
The entries in the payoff matrices are per acre returns. 
These were computed by determining the value of beef which 
could be produced by stocking at the rates implied by the 
farmer alternatives. Rates of gain were obtained from the 
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experimental data, Only the pains of the calves are valued. 
The cost of nay used, to make up pasture deficits is subtracted 
from the value of total gains. A pasture period of 153 days 
(May 15 to October 15) is used. For simplicity, it is assumed 
that alfalfa hay is fed to make up deficits. Value of pains 
foregone in good yerrs is also subtracted from the value of 
beef produced. For example, if a farmer stocks for • 9P animal 
unit days per acre and rets .44, he has an excess carrying 
capacity of .?? animal units per acre. This excess, multi­
plied by grazing days times daily rate of gain, gives the 
pounds of gain foregone. This is easily valued by multiplying 
bv the price of feeder calves. The value of gain remaining 
after subtracting costs of hay and gain foregone is the 
payoff. 
Table 19 gives the strategies and outcomes suggested by 
alternative decision criteria applied to the unimproved Ken­
tucky bluegrass data. A farmer who can plan for the long run 
may follow the Laplace solution. This calls for stocking 
for the next to best year. The Hurwicz criterion with 
0 6: .77 calls for the same plan. Yearly returns may range 
from É-7.46 to S31.07 but should average to S19.43. This r,lan 
also has a very low regret associated with it. 
A farmer, who must plan with short run outcomes in mind, 
may use a combination of stocking rates. He may stock 88 
percent of his pasture for average yields and 19 percent for 
Table 19. Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to 
Grundy-Shelby unimproved Kentucky bluegrass pasture data 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Type of Farmer Percent Min. Av . Max . Max. regret 
Criterion strategy alternative of land l/a• */a. ^/a. S/a. 
V/ald Mixed Average year 88 
Worst year 12 
100 3.65 13.39 "9.81 15.76 
Laplace Pure Next to best year 100 7.46 19.43 31.07 ?.88 
1—' 
Savage ^ 
regret Mixed Next to best year 9? 
Worst year 3 
100 7.69 IS.17 c%.53 9.65 
Hurwicz Pure 
0<,j\^.77 i:ext to best year 100 7.46 19.43 31.07 P.=3 
. 77 f. <=X 6. 1 Average year 100 8.4? 14.70 °5 -36 13.20 
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the worst possible year. This plsn assures the fermer of et 
least $3.65 per sere every year. However, his average income 
over the long run may be only 613.38. In some ye-rs he would 
miss the opportunity to obtain another 815.76 (regret). 
Plans for intermediate problem settings pre given by the 
Savage regret criterion and Hurwicz, criterion with .77^^-1. 
The Savage plan is for a farmer who must be slightly more con­
servative than one using the Laplace solution. The Hurwicz 
plan calls for stocking for average pasture. It requires only 
a slight reduction in security level and gives a sizeable 
gain in long run expectations. 
The results discussed above do not tell a farmer exactly 
what stocking rates he should use. They do present him with 
alternatives and possible consequences of using them. He may 
then choose the plan which best suits his situation. It should 
be remembered that many other plans could be devised. The 
ones presented here are those suggested by decision models 
which have been advanced for use in decision making under un­
certainty. 
Why do so many Iowa farmers stock for the worst possible 
year? This plan was not suggested as a pure strategy by any 
of the decision criteria used in Table 19. Perhaps one reason 
is that farmers do not evaluate the opportunity cost of unused 
pasture. Another possibility is that the goals implied by the 
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decision models used pre not actually those of farmers. 
Farmers may use other decision models which surgest very con­
servative plans. All of these tentative hypotheses might be 
tested. The result of such testing might le-d to development 
of different decision models or verification of the appro-
sriateness of those available. This dissertation does not in­
clude such tests; however, testing of the hypotheses appears 
to be a worthwhile research activity to be considered for the 
future. 
One reason for the results obtained may be the orice 
situation and feeding technique assumed. It is profitable to 
convert hay to beef in each price situation considered. Thus, 
the heavier stocking rates tend to be most profitable. Cattle 
may gain at a lower rate when hay makes up a large part of 
the feed supply• This would reduce the profitability of heav­
ier stocking rates. These factors should be considered when 
using the analysis to make direct recommendations to farmers. 
The example presented here has the primary purpose of demon­
strating the usefulness of game theoretic criteria for making 
decisions on stocking rates. 
Tables 53 and 54 indicate that yields of phosphate-
lespedeza-bluegrass pasture are considerably higher than those 
for unimproved bluegrass pasture. Table 20 shows the stra­
tegies and outcomes for phosphate-lespedeza-bluegrass pas­
ture. If s farmer wants the highest average long run returns 
Table 20. Strategies and. outcomes suggested by decision criteria applied to 
Grundy-Shelby pho sphate-lespedeza pasture de ta 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Type of Farmer Percent Kin. Av. Max. Max. regret 
Criterion strategy alternative of land S/a. 2/a. 3/a. •'/a. 
W a Id Mixed Worst year 43 
Next to best year 57 
100 19.49 f>4.78 31.65 9.05 
Laplace Pure Next to best year 100 1".87 9°. 93 40.71 1.45 
(—J 
savage w 
regret Mixed Worst year 6 
Next to best year 94 
100 19.55 99.96 39.45 1.36 
Hurwicz Pure 
0 ^ <^6.9 Next to best ye = r 100 18.97 ^9.93 40.71 1.45 
. 9 5 - 1 Average ye.? r 100 19.45 96.05 35.39 9.60 
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he might stock for the next to best year. This stocking rate 
strategy hps the highest average of any strategy considered. 
The outcomes for this plan rre shown by Table 20 in the La­
place solution row. The highest possible security level is 
obtained by stocking 43 percent of the pasture for the worst 
year end 57 percent for the next to best year. This is an 
appropriate plan for a farmer who must be assured the highest 
possible income every year. Even though a given farmer wants 
to minimize regret he is not likely to follow the Ssvage plan. 
It offers little reduction in regret as compared with the 
Laplace plan. The security level and long run average are 
both reduced by using the Savage regret solution. 
C. Choice of Livestock Enterprises 
The game theoretic criteria are useful in choosing be­
tween alternative livestock enterprises such as cattle or 
hogs. Prices are the major source of uncertainty in this 
problem. Thus, prices are the states of nature used in the 
following analysis. Once a choice has been made to produce 
hogs, beef or a combination of the two, the farming operation 
is not perfectly flexible. Housing, feeding equipment and 
breeding animals must be accumulated. These can not be 
economically purchased and sold as prices very. Fixed assets 
for hog production can not all be used for producing beef and 
conversely. Thus, rigidity is introduced into the farming 
operation. In view of these restrictions, which enterprise 
or combination of enterprises should farmers in various prob­
lem settings adopt? The following example is designed to 
snow one way of resolving the problem. 
Table 55 shows the payoff matrix for a farmer-nature 
enterprise problem. The farmer has two alternatives - hops 
and beef = Nature has eight alternatives (nog and beef prices 
which occurred during IS50-19 57). The payoffs are the value 
of beef or pork produced with 100 pounds of T.D.N. Costs 
other than those for feed are assumed eoual (30, to. P7) . 
Table 56 contains the regret matrix for this problem. 
The strategies and outcomes resulting from the p-ame 
theoretic criteria are shown in Table PI. Hogs are both the 
safest and the most profitable enterprise over the long run. 
Thus, both a conservative farmer and a long run profit max­
imiser may raise hogs. Regret is minimized by a combination 
of hogs and cattle. Cattle have the highest possible outcome 
in the payoff matrix. Thus, the solutions obtained tend to 
agree with common farmer evaluations of the enterprises. 
This problem could have included consideration of other 
sources of uncertainty in livestock enterprises. For example, 
trie coefficients implied for rates of gain or efficiency are 
simply averages. These may vary from year to year. In addi­
tion, numbers of pigs saved vary between years. Death loss 
varies between years. All of these uncertainties result from 
Table 21. Strategies and outcomes suggested by decision criteria an-oiled to the 
hog-c at tie enterprise choice problem 
Decision model 
Type of 
Criterion strategy 
Strategy 
Possible outcome 
Enterprise 
Percent 
of TEN 
Wald 
Laolace 
Savage 
regret 
Hurwicz 
0 < <=k < . 54 
. 54 £ ^ l 
Pure 
Pure 
Mixed 
Pure 
Hog! 
Hog! 
Hogs 
Cattle 
Cattle 
Hogs 
100 
100 
72 
28 
100 
100 
100 
Kin. 
{g/ioof 
of TDM 
3.55 
3. 55 
3.47 
3.26 
3.55 
Av . 
#/ioo# 
of TDN 
4.49 
4 .49 
4 .36 
4 .04 
4 .49 
M sx. 
{'/100# 
of TDM 
5.26 
5.26 
5.11 
5.60 
5.26 
ix. regret 
3/1004 
of TDN 
.56 
.56 
.49 
1.79 
56 
CD 
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uncontrollable and unpredictable natural conditions. Possible 
states of nature could include all combinations of these con­
ditions and weather. Alternatively, the other sources of un­
certainty could be used as the primary uncertainty in other 
f armer-nature games. The problems presented in thi<? chapter 
are only sone of the few to which game theoretic techniques 
are applicable. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study demonstrated the use of alternative decision 
models for farmer decision making under uncertainty. Partic­
uler emphasis was given to game theoretic models. These 
models have previously had little empirical application to 
farmer decision problems. However, this study has shown that 
they suggest plans which farmers in various problem settings 
may wish to follow. Research and extension personnel may 
want to use the models to derive farmer recommendations. 
Uncertainty is the usual environment for agricultural 
decisions. Uncertainty is introduced by technical and tech­
nological change, price variation and unpredictable human 
action. Technical uncertainty results from inability to ore-
diet relationships between agricultural inputs and outputs 
with a probability of one. Prediction is complicated by in­
ability to control natural inputs such as weather, insects 
and disease. Technological changes such as development of new 
products, production techniques and inputs may drastically 
affect the profitableness of farmer plans. Price variation 
results from varying world and national economic conditions, 
the state of natural factors affecting production and in­
flexible production processes. The actions of other indi­
viduals may also affect the outcome of farmers' plans. 
Obviously, these actions are not controllable or predictable. 
Uncertainty is used to describe a general condition of 
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change, imperfect knowledge, and lack of foresight. However, 
more technical descriptions of these conditions were reviewed 
in this study. Most classifications of knowledge situations 
use the language of probability distributions. Individuals 
evaluate objective probability measures in different ways, 
partly because of differences in experience. In addition, 
they may allow their personal situation and intuition to in­
fluence their classification of the knowledge situation. 
Thus, the more satisfactory classifications include subjective 
as well as objective elements of knowledge. Classes of know­
ledge for problems considered in this study were assumed to 
be subjective risk and subjective uncertainty. The knowledge 
situation affects the choice of models for decision making 
under uncertainty. 
Farmers must make decisions in their given, uncertain 
environment. How are these decisions to be made so that the 
plans resulting will, as nearly as possible, have the out­
comes desired by the farmer? This question expresses the 
problem this study was designed to investigate. 
Farmers can follow any of several models specifying how 
to plan under uncertainty. They may apply the models to their 
own problems directly or follow recommendations based on the 
models. Research and extension personnel influence choice 
of decision models through data and recommendations. Re­
search workers must use some choice mechanism to derive 
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recommendations. Published data may influence choice of de­
cision models by being suitable for use in only one or a few 
models. Farmers' abilities to plan rationally may be in­
creased by providing a variety of recommendations based on 
different decision models giving plans with outcomes desired 
by farmers.' Abilities may also be increased by providing 
data applicable to several decision models. 
Of the several models for decision making under uncer­
tainty, only the model for maximizing expected utilities, the 
game theoretic models, the naive or econometric models and 
various precautions for uncertainty provide an objective rule 
for obtaining an implicit or explicit goal. They are norma­
tive models. Positive models, which describe how individuals 
may or do choose under uncertainty, have been suggested by 
Simon and Shackle. These models do not lend themselves to 
application in a study such as this because they require sub­
jective choices which can only be made by the decision maker. 
The normative models can be applied to empirical problems by 
a research worker. The decision maker may then select the 
recommendation which fits his problem setting. 
The model for maximizing expected utility was called the 
probability (risk) model in this study. It may be used in a 
knowledge situation where the decision maker thinks he knows 
the probabilities of unpredictable events occurring (subjec­
tive risk). The probabilities are used in computing expected 
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outcomes for farmer alternatives. The alternative plan with 
the highest expected outcome is chosen by this model. Money 
income rather than utility is maximized. 
The game theoretic models have resulted from a special 
formulation of game theory, games against nature. The know­
ledge situation assumed in a game against nature is absolute 
uncertainty. Farmer problems may be thought of as a game 
against nature if a farmer's alternatives are regarded as 
his strategies and possible states of uncontrollable and un­
predictable events are treated as nature's strategies. 'The 
game theoretic models are techniques for obtaining solutions 
to the game against nature. 
The game theoretic criteria include the Wald, Savage 
regret, Hurwicz and Laplace. The Wald criterion calls for 
selecting a plan which allows a maximum minimum return regard­
less of which state of nature occurs. The Savage regret cri­
terion selects a plan which minimizes the opportunity cost of 
choosing a. less profitable plan, viewed ex. post. The Hurwicz 
criterion chooses a olan which has the highest pessimism-
optimism index, 
+ ( 1 - <=*> ) , 
where dk is an individual's pessimism index that the worst 
outcome, m^, will occur and ( 1 - ©O is his optimism index 
that the highest outcome, , will occur. Mj_ is the highest 
outcome for the ith farmer alternative and mj_ is the lowest 
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outcome for the 1th farmer alternative. The Laplace criterion 
chooses the plan which has the highest average over states of 
nature. These models subsume the naive models and the pre­
cautions for uncertainty. 
Each of the alternative decision models implies certain 
goals for the decision maker. Thus, one way of evaluating 
the appropriateness of the criteria is comparing the goals 
they imply with actual farmer goals. Farmer goals may be 
inferred from his problem setting. This study has shown that 
(a) alternative courses of action, (b) characteristics of the 
farmer, and (c) the knowledge situation with respect to states 
of nature may affect goals and thus the appropriateness of 
alternative decision criteria. Characteristics of a given 
farmer such as psychology with regard to risk, resource posi­
tion, family situation, work preference and rental arrangement 
are particularly influential on goals. Thus, they must be 
taken into account in making recommendations. Models used 
to derive recommendations should imnly actual farmer goals 
if recommendations are to represent rational farmer alterna­
tives. 
Decision models and problem setting components were 
brought together in this study to form a systematic procedure 
for deriving recommended solutions to farmer decision problems 
under uncertainty. Two problem settings were hypothesized. 
One setting is a long run profit maximizing setting which 
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characterizes a fermer having the resource position and per­
sonal attributes allowing long run planning. The other set­
ting characterizes a. farmer who must consider the level of 
possible short run outcomes because of limited resources, risk 
aversion or family responsibilities. 
The Laplace criterion is appropriate for the long run 
pro clem setting. 'The average ( naive) model is also appro­
priate for this setting but is subsumed by the Laplace cri­
terion in most cases. The Wald criterion is appropriate for 
the short run setting. The Hurwicz criterion with a range 
of including 1 is also appropriate for the short run set­
ting. However, a Wald mixed strategy allows a higher secu­
rity level than the Hurwicz. The Hurwicz criterion with an 
c* of 0 is a gambling alternative. It emphasizes obtaining 
the highest outcome possible. The Savage regret criterion is 
not easily classified in either problem setting. It may sug­
gest a plan appropriate for either, depending on the nature 
of the outcome matrix. One can only be sure that the Savage 
regret plan will minimize regret. 
Actual farmer problems were considered to demonstrate 
techniques of using models and to show the kinds of recom­
mendations which may result. The problems considered were 
a particular class of within farm and within enterprise prob­
lems. They included problems requiring choice of crop vari­
eties, kinds and amounts of fertilizer, crop enterprises, 
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pasture mixtures, stocking rates and livestock enterprises. 
Data were obtained from annual progress reports on lows Ex­
periment Station experimental farms. Thus, this study 
demonstrated that presently available experimental data may 
be used in various decision models. A limitation of this 
study was that the length of data series was relatively short. 
Therefore, the sets of states of nature considered were small. 
Ideally, this set should include many states of nature- The­
oretically, it should include all possible. In the absence 
of all possible states of nature, s decision maker can only 
use the data available. 
Actual problem solutions suggested by the alternative 
decision models frequently differed. For ex'amole, in one 
problem, farmer alternatives were varieties of oats for plant­
ing in northeast Iowa- States of nature were different years 
in which oat yields had been observed. The Laplace solution 
called for planting Clarion oats to maximize long run yields. 
The Ivald solution suggested planting 56 percent of oat land 
to Clintland oats and 44 percent to Sauk. This plan assured 
a minimum oat yield which was 5 bushels higher than any other 
plan. Regret was minimized by planting ?5 percent Clint land, 
66 percent Clarion and 9 percent Sauk. Major differences be­
tween these plans are evident. 
The y/ald and Laplace solutions were the same in eight of 
18 problems. Thus, even though a researcher may frequently 
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ce required to recommend a number of plans to fit different 
problem settings, he can sometimes make one recommendation 
suitable to a range of problem settings. However, this re­
sult cannot be generalized because problem characteristics 
differ greatly. Thus, the appropriateness of recommendations 
can only be determined by applying several choice models to 
each farmer roblem. 
A comparison of the Wald, Savage regret and Laplace prob­
lem solutions showed that the Savage criterion plan had the 
second highest security level in 14 of IS problems. It had 
the second highest average in nine problems and third highest 
in nine problems. Thus, for the problems considered, the 
Savage regret criterion appeared to give plans intermediate 
between those for maximizing long run profit and assuring a 
minimum return in the short run. This conclusion is given 
weight by the fact that the Savage regret criterion plan had 
the second highest possible maximum in 11 of 18 problems. 
As expected, the Hurwicz criterion plan, with a range of 
cK including 0, had the highest maximum in all 18 problems. 
The Laplace tied with the Hurwicz criterion for highest max­
imum eight times in 18 problems. The Wsld criterion plan had 
the lowest maximum in 10 of 18 problems. 'Thus, in the prob­
lems considered, use of the Wald plan would require giving 
up the opportunity for the highest possible return a majority 
of the time. 
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Regret was always minimized by usine the Savage regret 
plan. Ko other criterion even tied with the Savage regret 
plan in that category. The Savage regret criterion was thus 
demonstrated to ce unique among the criteria for obtaining 
minimum regret. It is theoretically possible to obtain a 
plan which minimizes regret with other criteria. 
This study has demonstrated that application of several 
decision models to agricultural problems can result in recom­
mendations suited to a wide range of farmer situations. The 
models are mechanically easy to apply and are relatively easy 
to understand. The study also demonstrated that data repre­
senting the influence of many possible levels of uncontroll­
able and unpredictable natural variables are needed for 
application of relevant models for decision making under un­
certainty . Research planners should consider the value of 
obtaining data of this kind, perhaps as a supplementary 
product of research designed for another purpose. It should 
be clear that data published in the form of averages is only 
one of several data forms that may be useful. 
Game theoretic techniques may have considerable use in 
whole farm planning. Usually, input-output coefficients used 
in linear programming or budgeting are simply averages. They 
are subject to variation. This variation may affect the 
profitableness of the whole farm plan. Some farmers may want 
to ce sure that income levels will not fall below some min-
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iffium, feasible level. Thus, e whole f ? rm plan bp sea on aver­
age input-output coefficients may not be acceptable. However, 
farmers might accept a plan which assures a maximum minimum 
level each year. Such a plan may be based on input-output 
coefficients derived from a game against nature by applica­
tion of the Vvald criterion. The ïald solution for a crop 
enterprise problem would suggest a plan which assures a min­
imum return. The minimum return may be regarded as the output 
coefficient. The input coefficient is given by the combina­
tion of variety, fertilizer and cultural practices required 
for the crop plan selected. The particular crop is an 
activity to be included in linear programming analysis de­
signed to plan the whole farm operation. 
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Table 22. Payoff matrix for the farmer-nature, Seymour-
Shelby , opt variety problem8 
Farmer State of nature (year) 
alternative 
(variety) 
1953 
bu./a. 
1954 
bu./a. 
1955 
bu./a. 
1957' 
bu ./a 
Bonham 4P 59 117 96 
Cherokee 4G 60 112 100 
Clintland 44 GO 120 121 
Clinton 40 58 119 62 
Clarion 50 68 116 72 
Sauk 52 59 133 92 
aSource of data: (21). 
^Ko oats were harvested on the Seymour-Shelby farm in 
1956 because of drought. Thus, yields in that year were the 
same for each variety and are not considered in the analysis. 
The all zero yields would not affect nlans given that oats 
are to be grown. However, they would affect plans if the 
problem is choosing between two crops such as barley and oats. 
15? 
Table 23. Payoff matrix for fermer-nature, western Iowa, 
oat variety problem9 
Farmer State of nature (year) 
alternative 1953 1954 1955 195G 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./s- bu./s. bu./a. bu./a. 
Eonham 53 57 80 PI 96 
Cherokee 53 66 74 °5 100 
Clintland 49 57 89 16 1?1 
Clarion 67 73 88 17 7? 
Sauk 63 78 100 14 9? 
8Source of data: (93). 
Table ?4. Savage regret matrix 
variety problem 
for S eymour-Sheiby, oat 
Farmer St ate of nature (year) 
alternative 
(variety) 
1953 
bu./s. 
19 54 
bu . / n 
1955 
bu./a. 
1957 
bu./s 
Bo nil am -10 -7 -16 
-25 
Cherokee -6 -6 -21 -PI 
Clintland -8 -6 -13 0 
Clinton -IP -8 -14 -59 
Clarion -? 0 -17 -49 
Sauk 0 -7 0 -P9 
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Table ?5. Savage regret matrix 
variety problem 
for western Iowa, oat 
Farmer State of nature ( years) 
alternative 
(variety) 
1953 
bu./a. 
1954 
bu./a-
1955 
bu./a. 
1956 
bu./a. 
1957 
bu ./a 
Bonham -14 -21 -20 -4 -1 
Cherokee -14 -12 -2G 0 -6 
Clintland -IB -21 -11 -9 0 
Clarion 0 c. — v -12 -S -9 
Sauk -4 0 0 -11 -2 
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Table 26. Farmer-nature psyoff matrix for western lows, 
barley variety oroblem8 
Farmer State of nature (year) 
alternative 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a- bu./a. bu./a. 
Plains 39 58 61 21 62 
Kars 41 44 48 16 68 
^Source of data: (23). 
Table 27. Savage regret matrix for wen tern lows, barley 
variety problem 
Farmer State of nature (year) 
alternative 1953 1954 19 55 1956 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Plains —3 0 0 0 —6 
Mars 0 -14 -13 -5 0 
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Table 26. Fermer-nature payoff matrix for northeast lowe, 
corn variety problems 
Farmer State of nature (years) 
alternative 1953 1954 1955 1956 ~ 195?" 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Pioneer 34? 118 115 87 123 113 
Pioneer 371 122 114 93 121 107 
Pioneer 352 121 118 87 116 113 
Pioneer 349 122 113 86 126 113 
P.A.G. 277 117 110 86 129 119 
^Source of data: (17). 
Table 29. Farmer-nature regret matrix for northeast Iowa, 
corn variety problem 
Farmer State of nature (years) 
elternetive 1953 1954 " 1955 1956 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Pioneer 347 -4 -3 -6 -6 
Pioneer 371 0-4 0 -8 -12 
Pioneer 352 -1 0 -6 -11 - -6 
Pioneer 349 0 -c -7 -3 -6 
P.A.G-. 277 -5 -8 -? 0 0 
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Table 30. B'armer-nature payoff_matrix for southern Iowa, 
corn variety problem*' 
Farmer State of nature (years) 
alternative 
( variety) 
1952 
bu./a. 
1953 
bu./a. 
1954 
bu./a. 
1955 
bu./a. 
1956 
bu./a• 
1957 
bu. / a 
Pioneer 30lb 110 118 es 79 °4 114 
P.A.G-. 170 IIP 1P1 75 76 91 104 
U.S. 13 108 117 75 75 97 110 
P.A.G. 361 113 10 F 79 77 85 106 
Pioneer 300 110 117 73 77 86 108 
Keygold 47 115 11.9 69 73 85 110 
Maygold 59a IIP 115 7P 69 84 110 
Iowa 4565 118 113 79 73 78 103 
P.A.G. 253 111 113 83 75 84 100 
aSource of data: (17). 
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Table 31. Farmer-nature regret matrix for southern Iowa, 
corn variety problem 
Farmer 
alternative 
(vari ety) 
1952 
State of nature (years) 
"1953 """"1954 1955 1956 
bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Pioneer 301b 
P.A.G. 170 
U.S. 13 
381 
Pioneer 300 
M aygoId 47 
MaygoId 59a 
Iowa 4 565 
P.A.G-. 253 
-ft 
•10 
-o 
-S 
-o 
0 
-7 
-ô 
0 
-4 
•15 
-4 
-Q 
-ft 
-13 
-9 
-15 
-19 
-16 
-9 
-5 
0 
_2 
-3 
-1 
-1 
-5 
-9 
-5 
-3 
-7 
n 
- 6  
-13 
-7 
1957 
bu./a 
0 
-10 
-4 
-8 
- 6  
-4 
-4 
-11 
-14 
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Table 32. Payoff matrix for the fermer-nature, northeast 
Iowa, M-P-K problem/ (no charge for manure) 
S tete of nature (yeer) 
Fermer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1959 1957 
alternative S/a. S/a. $/e. £/e. ?/e. 2/*. 
(Ck.) No fertilizer 26 .98^ 0 14 .9" 4 .08 79 16 .59 
(M) 5 tons manure 53 .09 17.46 53 . °4 14 .80 45. 00 43 .48 
(P) 30# PpOs 28 .00 4.64 -.79 5 .30 13. 19 19 .60 
(%) 30# KgO 35 .06 -.71 97 .89 1 .76 35. 59 3? .26 
(PK) 30# KgO 
end Pp0% 
30# PgOc - " 33 .63 5.70 32 .11 o .40 35. 34 33 .79 
(MP) 6 tons manure 
30# KgO G4 .84 23.61 49 .36 10 .98 43. 94 38 .05 
(MK) 6 tons manure 
30# KgO 50 .95 18.46 16 .48 9 .72 48.48 42 .88 
(MPK) 6 tons manure 
30# KgO 
30# PgOs 53 .94 21.54 51 .94 6 .34 38 > 92 37 .31 
a5ource of date: (20). 
bThe returns per acre payoffs only reflect the part of 
per acre returns which are influenced by states of nature or 
fertilizer practices. This was achieved by subtracting the 
lowest yield in the no fertilizer row of the date from ell 
other entries in the yield matrix. This left the portion of 
yields which vary with years or fertilizer practices. These 
yields were converted to dollar returns from which fertilizer 
costs, application costs end other costs which very with 
additional yields were subtracted. This is a partiel budget­
ing technique which simplifies the enelysis. The corn price 
used was $1.10. Costs of fertilizer nutrients were : (e) 
nitrogen, 13d per lb.; (b) potassium, per lb.; and (c) 
phosphorus, 10^ per lb. A cost of 15/ per bu. was computed 
for harvesting, hauling and storing corn. Source of price 
data : (43). 
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Table 3-3. Savage regret matrix for northeast Iowa, M-T-K 
o rob lex. (no charge for manure) 
State__of nature (year) 
Farmer 195? 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative s/&. Ç/a. S/g. "'/a. -/a. "'/a. 
Ck. -37.86 -93.61 -38.8? -10.7? -19.70 -18.78 
M -11.76 -G.15 0 0 -3.48 0 
P -36.84 -18.97 -54.5? -9.50 -35.30 -"4.88 
K -28.78 -?4.3? -?5.85 -13.04 -12.90 -11.?? 
PK -31.?1 -17.91 -21.63 -5.40 -13.14 -9.76 
MP 0 0 -4.38 -3.8? -4.54 -5.43 
MK -13.89 -5.15 -37.?6 -5.08 0 -.60 
HPK -10.90 -2.07 -1.90 -8.46 -9.55 -6.17 
Table 34. Payoff matrix for farmer-nature M-P-K problem in 
northeast Iowa (charge for manure) 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 195? 1953 1954 19 5 5 19 56 1957 
alternative 5/a. ê/a. Ç/a. ?/s. -'/a. \/r. 
Ck. 26.98 0 14.9? 4.08 ?8.78 "4.70 
M 39.88 4.96 40 . 54 1.60 31.80 30.?8 
P 28.00 4.64 -.78 5.30 13.18 18.60 
K 36.06 -.71 ?7.89 1.76 35.58 32.26 
PK 33.63 5.70 32.11 9.40 35.34 33.72 
kP 51.64 10.41 36.16 -2.22 30.74 ?4.85 
MK 37.73 5.26 33.28 -3.48 35.98 29.68 
MPK 40.74 8.34 38.74 -6.86 ?5.7? ?4.11 
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Table 35. Savage regret matrix for f 
problem in northeast Icv;a 
armer-na 
(charge 
ture M-P-K 
for manure) 
St F te of nature (year) 
Farmer 
alternative 
195? 
3/a. 
1953 
/ a • • 
1954 
-/a. 
1955 
'/a. 
1956 
"'/a . 
1957 
S / a. 
Ck. -24.66 -10.41 -25.6? -5.39 -6.80 -9.02 
M -11.76 -6.15 0 -7.80 -3.78 —3 .44 
P -93.64 -5.77 -41.39 -4.10 -92.40 -15.19 
K -15.58 -11.1? -12.65 -7.64 0 -1.46 
PK -18.01 -4.71 -9.43 0 -.94 0 
MP 0 0 -4.39 -11.6? -4.94 -8.87 
MK -13.89 -5.15 -7.96 -19.88 -.30 -4.04 
MPK -10.90 -?.07 -1.80 -16.26 -9.86 -9.61 
Table 36. Payoff matrix for farmer-nature M-P-K problem in 
north eastcentral Iowa8 (no charge for manure) 
State of n ature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative 9/2. $/e. S/a. ç/a. v / 8 .  / a. 
Ck. 0 26.03 40.56 8.93 10.64 31.73 
M 47.38 58.59 70.94 30.76 17.55 62.86 
P -.97 22.30 48.94 .84 10.69 34.08 
K 10.70 18.39 30.27 8.60 -.99 93.52 
PK 23.66 29.36 61.28 16.82 12.84 57.76 
MP 46.32 57.72 69.02 26.18 23.80 72.44 
MK 43.35 57.22 66.82 27.86 19.41 59.88 
MPK 44.94 59.16 66.28 94.01 93.06 54.90 
aSource of data: (18). 
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Table 37. Savage regret matrix for north eastcentral Iowa 
M-P-K problem (no charge for manure) 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 195? 1953 1954 1955 1956" 1957 
alternative %/a. c/a. S/a. 3/a. S/a. S/a. 
Ck. -47.38 -33.13 -30.38 -^1.83 -13.16 -40.71 
M 0 -.57 0 0 -6.25 -9.58 
P -48.35 -36.86 -92.70 -29.9? -13.18 -38.36 
K -36.68 -40.77 -40.67 -99.16 --4.79 -48.92 
PK -?3.?9 -29.80 -9.66 -13.94 -10.96 -14.68 
MP -1.06 -1.44 -1.9? -4.58 0 0 
MK -4.03 -1.94 -4.19 -9.90 -4.39 -19.56 
MPK -3.14 0 -4.66 -6.75 -.74 -8.?4 
Table 38. Payoff matrix for farmer-nature M-P-K problem in 
north eastcentral Iowa (charge for manure) 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative S/a• #/a. S/a. S/a. S/a. S/a. 
Ok". 0 26.03 40.56 8.93 10.64 31.73 
M 34.18 45.39 57.74 17.56 4.35 49.66 
P -.97 92.30 48.24 .84 10.69 34.08 
K 10.70 18.39 30.97 8.60 -.99 93.52 
PK 23.65 29.36 61.28 16.82 12.B4 57.76 
MP 33.12 44.52 55.89 19.98 10.60 59.94 
MK 30.15 44.02 53.62 14.66 6.21 46.68 
MPK 31.04 45.96 53.08 10.81 9.86 51.00 
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Table 39. Savage regret matrix for north erstcentrsl loua 
M-P-K problem (charge for manure) 
State of nature (vear)_ 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 "Ï956 """1957 
alternative S/a. S/a. S/a. S/a. S/a. S/s. 
Ck. -34.18 -19.93 -PO.7? -8-63 -P.20 -97.51 
K 0 -.57 -3.54 0 -9.49 -9.58 
P -35.15 -23.66 -13.04 -16.7? -2.92 -25.16 
K -23.48 -27.57 -31.01 -8.95 -13.83 -35.72 
PK -10.52 -16.60 0 -.74 0 -1.48 
MP -1.06 -1.44 -5.4G -4.58 -%.24 0 
MK -4.03 -1.94 -7.66 -2.90 -6.63 -12.56 
MPK -3.14 0 -8.20 -6.75 -2.98 -8.24 
Table 40. Data and. regression equations for the nitrogen-stand-variety experiment 
in Wayne county9-
Early variety - Iowa 4297 
Lbs. N Plants 1953 1954 1955 "1956 1957 
per a. per a. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. 
8,000 55.2 26 .6 26.6 50 . 5 47.3 52 . 5 21 .9 24 .4 49 .8 55 .7 
12,000 56.9 8 .1 23.3 56 .8 50.3 47 • 2 9 .1 13 .2 60 .3 52 • 1 
16,000 54.2 6 .6 11.3 63 .9 58.4 43 . 6 3 .2 3 .4 65 .7 64 . 7 
20,000 43.4 3 . 7 10.3 53 .0 55.2 38 .0 2 . 6 p .4 64 .1 61 .5 
8,000 59 .5 28 .2 30.0 55 . 5 58.4 53 .0 21 .5 23 .4 53 .6 66 .2 
12,000 60.9 11 .9 24.5 58 .3 66.2 54 .3 9 13 .7 59 .0 70 .9 
16,000 71.1 6 .5 18.0 71 .1 81.6 58 .0 3 .8 8 • 8 71 .6 89 .8 
20,000 58.8 3 .0 11.0 63 .4 83.5 44 .1 3 c; 6 . 6 70 .7 86 .6 
8,000 63.8 19 .6 41.4 48 .2 54.9 58 .0 18 .0 30 .0 48 .8 65 .5 
12,000 65.5 13 .0 27.5 54 .0 69.2 51 .8 11 .6 ^0 ,0 57 .6 69 • 1 
16,000 67.9 5 .5 16.7 61 .1 83.2 59 .8 7 .9 6 . 7 68 .9 96 .9 
20,000 66.4 5 .2 9.8 56 .3 88.4 55 . 5 4 . 1 4 .2 60 . 7 88 .4 
Regression equation for the early variety:^ 
Y = -144,8603 + .5268X-, - .0639Xi^ + 35.3228X, - 1.5640X,^ - .1063XiXo 
(1.3) (1.03) (4.35) (3.6) (1.4)^ ' 
+ .OII4X1X2X3 ; = .69 ; d.f. = 53 
Adapted variety - A.E.S . 801 
19 53 19 54 19 55 "1956" 1957 
bu. bu . bu. bu . bu. 
perenthesis below coefficients 
Table 40. (Continued) 
Early variety - Iowa 4P9? Adapted variety - A . E . S . 801 
Lbs. N Plants 1953 1954 1955 1956 " 195? 1953 1954 "1955 19 56 1957 
per a. per a. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. 
Regression equation for the adapted variety: 
Y = -149.7796 + 1.1635X-, - .0421X-,2 + 34.1749X3 _ 1.4083X^' - . 1059X-,Xo 
(1.097 (.75) (4.6) (3.6) (1.5) ' 
+ .OllSXnXpX^ • R2 = .79 
(1.7) 
Xj_ = nitrogen ; Xg = stand ; Xg = current year rainfall (june rainfall (—4 inches) 
-t- July rainfall (—5 inches) + August rainfall (66 inches )3 t- carry-over ( pre­
vious year rainfall - 21 inches) 
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'Table 41. Payoff matrix for fermer-nature ni tro gen-stand-
variety problem'" 
Farmer slternetive 
Early variety, 
stand = 12,000, N = 0 9.25" 35 .84 50 .85 5? .28 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= l?,ocn, K = 0 3.05 31 .67 49 .62 55 .00 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= 12,000, K = 10 9.39 31 .41 49 .44 56 .10 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= 12,000, K = 20 1.67 31 .10 49 .41 56 .34 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= 12,000, K = 40 .31 30 .23 49 .09 56 .58 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= 16,000, N = 40 
-.78 29 .51 48 .73 56 .59 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= 16,000, N = 60 
-2.85 28 .18 48 .14 56 .73 
Adapted 
stand 
variety, 
= 20,000, N = 60 
-4.24 27 .93 47 .85 56 .99 
8Source of drta: (21). 
^Returns shown equal bushels times $.95 a bushel for corn 
less seed and fertiliser costs. Fertilizer costs include 
application expenses. Corn price used is $1.10 - .15 per 
bushel harvesting, hauling and storage costs. Source of urice 
data: (43). 
ft e ; ther (rainfall in Inches) 
9 in, A 6 in. S/a. y< 
10 in 
-/a. 
12 in. 
2/a. 
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Table 42. Savage regret matrix for farmer-nature nitrogen-
stand-variety problem 
Rainfall 
6 in. 1? in. 
Farmer alternative tia • S/a. 
Early vr riety, s tand = if,ooo, = 0 0 -4 .71 
^Adapted veriety, stand = 12,000, K = 0 -6 .20 
-.99 
/ 
Adapt ed variety, stand = 12,000, N = 10 -6 .9-3 
-.89 
Adapted variety, stand = 19,000, K = 20 -7 .58 
-.65 
Adap ted variety, stand = 12,000, K = 40 -8 .94 -.41 
Adapted variety, stand = 16,000, N = 40 -10 .0-3 -.40 
Adapted variety, stand = 16,000, K = 60 
-12 .10 -.26 
Adapted variety, s tand = 20,000, N = 60 -13 .49 0 
17? 
Table 43. Payoff matrix for^farmer-nature crop enterprise 
selection problem8 
State of nature (yea r) 
Farmer 
alternative 
1953 
S/a. 
1954 
>/a. 
1955 
Vf-
1956 
Va. 
1957 
V". 
Sauk oats 30 47 8 G4 
Clint land o C:ts 33 41 41 ? 49 
Plains barley 30 46 46 17 50 
Cherokee oats 28 35 35 13 53 
aSource of data: (P3 ). 
^Payoffs a 
acre. The oat 
price was 8.80 
re the gros 
price used 
per bushel 
s value 
was #.5 
(43). 
of the p 
3 per bus 
roducti 
hel and 
on from one 
the barley 
Table 44. Savage regret matrix for the crop-enterprise 
selection problem 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1953 1954 1955 1956 195' 
alternative /a • f/a. f/a. 3/a. VP 
Sauk oats -7 -16 -6 -9 0 
Clintland oats -0 -5 -4 -10 -15 
Plains barley -3 -0 0 0 -14 
Cherokee oats -5 -11 -10 -4 -11 
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Table 45. Payoff matrix for farmer-nature pasture mixture 
problem in Howard county* 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
Alfa Ifa-bromegrass 2.0^ 1.7 P.8 3 .6 
Trefoi1-bromegrass 1.7 1.8 2.3 p .4 
Ladino-Kentucky bluegrass 3.4 1.5 1.2 p .3 
Lsdino-orchardgrass 3.? 1.5 1.4 1 .6 
Alf a.lf a-timo thy 1.9 1.9 2.G 3 .1 
8Source of data: (20). 
^Yields are in tons of weed-free dry matter oer acre 
per year- These may be converted to lbs. of T.D.N, by multi­
plying 1.14 x tons per acre x % T.D.N, for the pasture. The 
factor, 1.14, converts yields to lbs. of 12% moisture hay. 
Table 46. Savage regret matrix for Howard county pasture 
mixture problem 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1954 1955 195G 1957 
alternative tons/a • tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
AlfaIf a-bromegrass -1.4 
-.2 0 0 
Trefoi1-bromegrass -1.7 -.1 -.5 -1.2 
Ladino-Kentucky bluegrass 0 -.4 
-1.6 -1.3 
Ladino-orchardgrsss 
-.2 -.4 ' -1.4 
-2.0 
Alf' s If a- ti mo thy -1.5 0 0 -.5 
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Table 47. Farmer-nature payoff matrix for Soil Conservation 
Farm, alfalfa-grans, pasture problem" 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
alternative tons/a. tons/a- tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
Alfalfa-
Kentucky bluegrass 2.5^ 4 .1 4.3 4.3 2.7 
Alfalfa-
smooth bromegrass 2.5 4.2 4.5 3.7 2.2 
Alfalf a-
orchardgrass ?.5 4.3 4.5. 4.4 ?.6 
8 Source of data : (2?). 
^Yields of pasture in tons of weed-free dry matter oer 
sere per year. 
Table 48. Savage regret matrix for Soil Conservation Farm, 
alfalfa-grass, pasture oroblem 
State of nature (year) 
Fermer 1959 1953 1954 1955 1956 
alternative tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
Alfalfe-
Kentucky bluegrass 0 -,P -.3 -.1 0 
Alfalfa-
smooth bromegrass 0 -.1 1 -.5 -.5 
Alfa If8-
orchardgrass 0 0 0 0 -.1 
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Table 49. Farmer-nature payoff matrix for the Soil Conserva­
tion Farm, non-alfalfa legume-grass pasture 
problem8 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
alternative tons/a. tons/a. tons/a . tons/a. tons/a• 
Trefoil-
Kentucky bluegrass 1.0° °.3 2.0 1-1 1*0 
Trefoll-
smooth bromegrass .7 2.1 0•2 1.0 1.1 
Trefoil-
orchardgrass 1.0 1.8 °.4 1.0 1.0 
Ladino-
orchardgrass 1.9 1.6 1.4 .6 .5 
^Source of data: (22). 
^Yields are in tons of weed-free dry matter per acre 
per year. 
Table 50. Savage regret matrix for the Soil Conservation 
Farm, non-alfalfa pasture problem 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 - 1953 1954 1955 1956 
alternative tons/a. tons/a. tons/a . tons/a. tons/a 
Trefoil-
Kentucky bluegrass -.9 0 -.4 0 -.1 
Trefoil-
smooth bromegrass -1.9 -.2 -.2 -.1 0 
Trefoil-
orchardgrass -.9 -.5 0 -.1 -.1 
Ladino-
orchardgrass 0 -.7 -1.0 -.5 -.5 
Table 51. Farmer-nature pasture stocking rate problem for unimproved pasture in 
Grundy-Shelby soil area3 (8/a . ) 
Cow and caIf carrying capacity per acre 
.23 .31 .40" 
Farmer Prices Prices Prie es 
alternatives 19 53 Av.D 19 56 19 53 __AVj 19 55 19 53 Av • 19 56 
Plan for average 
pasture - .390 S.42*17.15 10.89 12.98 21.59 15.44 17.08 25.30 19.48 
Plan for worst 
year - .23 10.34 15.35 11.79 6.74 10.01 7.69 2.70 4.01 3.09 
Plan for next to best 
year and feed hay - .47 7.46 17.04 10.43 12.01 ^2.49 14.99 17.14 *7.48 ?0.10 
Cow and calf carrying:1 capacity per acre 
._47 " ._55 
Farmer Prie es Prices 
alternatives 19 53 Av. 19 56 1953 Av. 19 56 
Plan for average 
pasture - .39 13.93 20.69 15.89 10.34 15.36 11.OQ 
Plan for worst 
yecr - .23 -.44 -.66 -.50 -4.04 -5.99 -4.59 
Plan for next to best 
year and feed hay- .47 91.12 31.07 *4.09 17.5? op.56 19.98 
8Source of data: (13, 19, 31). 
^Average prices of hay and grain, 1948-1957 (34, 4 3). 
^Stocking rate ir: animal units per acre-
^Payoi'fs are returns per acre from the given stocking rate minus hay costs and 
value of gains foregone. 
Table o2. Savage regret matrix for unimproved posture stocking v p te problem (*/p.) 
Cow and calf carrying capacity per mere 
.93 .31 .40 
fermer Prices Prices Prices 
alternatives 195-3 Av. 19 56 19 53 Av. 19 56 1955 Av. 195" 
Plan for average 
pasture - .39 -1.92 0 -.90 0 -.90 0 -.06 -?.l? -.^9 
r .1.in for worst 
year - .23 0 -1.80 0 -5.»4 -19.49 -7.75 -14.44 -*3.47 -17.01 
Plan for next to 
best year - .47 -2.88 -.11 -1.35 -.97 0 -.4" 0 0 0 
Cow and c alf carrying.- c apacity per a cre__ 
. .47 "" .55 H 
Farmer Prices Prices S? 
alternatives "Ï953 Â7T Ï956" 1953 1956^ ^ 
Plan for avera:e 
pasture - .39 -7.19 -10.38 -8-19 -7.18 -13.20 -9.18 
Plan for worst 
year - .23 -21.55 -31.73 -94.56 -91.55 -34.cb -24.57 
PI^n for next to 
best year - .47 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 53."' Farmer-nature pasture stocking rate problem for oho snh p t e-1e sp ed e za 
pasture in the Grundy-Shelby soil area*2 ( $/a. ) 
Cow and calf carrying capacity per acre_ 
.43 """ .47 "" " .50" 
Farmer Prices Prices Prices 
alternativ es 1953 Av. 1956 19 53 Av . 19 56 19 53 Av • 19 56 
Plan for average 
pasture - . 52 19 .45 31.50 22 .91 21.72 33 . 72 25.19 23.43 35.39 26.89 
Plan for worst 
year - .43 20.32 30.18 ^3.18 18.43 27.37 21.0? 17.01 ^5.27 19 .41 
Plan for next to best 
year and feed hay - .58 18.87 32.38 22 .73 21.15 34 .60 25.00 *2 .86 36.27 26.71 
Cow and calf carry! ng capacity per acre 
. 58 .62 
Farmer Prices Prices 
alternatives 19 53 Av. 1956 1953 Av. 19 56 
P1an for average 
pasture - .52 21.73 32.29 24 .80 19.84 29 .30 22. 64 
Plan for worst 
year - .43 13.23 19.65 15.10 11.34 16.84 1^.94 
Plan for next to best 
year and feed hay - .58 27.41 40.71 31.26 25. 52 37.90 29.10 
H 
<3 
CD 
aSee footnotes in Table 51 for an explanation of this table. 
^Source of data: (19). 
Table 54. 
Cow and çalf carrying capacity ner acre 
.43 " ' " .4? "".50 
Farmer Prices Prices Prices 
alternatives 1953 Av. 19 56" 1953 Av. 1956" Ï9 53 "Av. "" "1956 
Plan for average 
pasture - .52 -.87 -.86 -.27 0 -.89 0 0 -.98 0 
o year - .43 0 -2.20 0 -3.29 -7.93 -4.17 -6.4* -11.OH -7.4f 
>lan for next to 
best year - .58 -1.45 0 -.45 -.57 0 -.19 -.57 0 -.18 
Cow and_calf carrying capacity _p ev__acre __ 
. 58 ' j_62 1 " H 
Farmer Prices ^ 
alternatives 19 53 " :Av. IS 56 " 1953 Av - "19 56 
Plan for average 
pasture - .52 -5.68 -8.42 -6.46 -5.68 -8.60 -6.46 
Plan for worst 
year - .43 -14.80 -21.06 -16.16 -14.18 -21.06 -16.16 
Plan for next to 
cest year - .58 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 55. Farmer-nature payoff matrix for hog-cattle choice problem (f/100# T.D.N.) 
State of npture 
(Prices of hoes and cattle 1956-1957) 
Yeer 1950 1951 195? 1953 1954 1955" 1956 1957 
Farmer Price of hoys 17.70 19.70 17.40 91.10 PI.00 15.00 14.*0 17.60 
alternative Price of cattle *5.30 -31.10 97.-30 19.-30 19.60 19.00 IP.40 20.10 
Produce hogs 4.42* 4.92 4.-35 5.26 5.25 3.75 -3.55 4.40 
Produce cet tie 4.55 5.60 4.91 3.47 3. 53 3.4* 3.26 -3.62 
- . f—1 
aP fi yciï's are the v slue of 100 pounds of T.D.N, per acre. One hundred pounds ° 
of T.D.ii. will produce 18 pounds of beef or 25 pounds of pork with feed requirements 
of breeding animals included (30). Other costs associated with the two enterprises 
are assumed to be about equal. 
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Table 56. Savage regret matrix for hog-cattle choice 
problem 
State of nature 
Farmer (Prices of hops and cattle, 1950-1957) 
alternative 1950 1951 1959 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Produce 
hogs -.13 -.68 -.56 0 0 0 0 0 
Produce 
cattle 0 0 0 -1.79 -1.7P -.33 -.99 -.78 
